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"I WILL BUILD MY HOUSE WITH STICKS":
THE SPLINTERING OF PROPERTY INTERESTS
UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT MAY BE
HAZARDOUS TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
Maureen Straub Kordesh*

INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution' and
the state's police power are the endpoints of a continuum of gov-

ernmental interference with private property. The Fifth Amendment
prohibits the taking of private property for public use without just

compensation. This constitutional protection of the rights of property owners promotes fairness and protects autonomy and private
incentive. 2 A Fifth Amendment taking is most clearly exemplified
by the government's power of eminent domain. 3 At the other end
of the continuum is the state's police power to promulgate regula-

tions that promote the public health, safety, and morals. 4 The Supreme Court has characterized the police power as "one of the most

essential powers of government-one that is the least limitable."5
* Associate Professor and Director, Lawyering Skills Program, The John Marshall
Law School, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Kalamazoo College, 1981; M.A., Indiana UniversityBloomington, 1984; J.D., Indiana University-Bloomington, 1986. The author gratefully
acknowledges the financial assistance of Widener University School of Law in the
completion of this project. The author would like to acknowledge the exceptional effort
of John F. Nivala, who read several drafts of this Article, offered his wisdom, and generally
provided the mentoring that made the completion of this project possible. The author
extends her thanks to Richard Lazarus and Emily Field van Tassel for their time and effort
in reading previous drafts of this Article. The author would also like to extend her
appreciation to Valerie Canino for her research assistance. Beth Schaffer deserves credit
for her secretarial assistance in typing much of the draft. Finally, the author would like to
thank Richard Straub Kordesh, without whose ideas, intellectual spark, and daily support
this effort would never have come to fruition. This Article is dedicated to him.
1. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation!'
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 43-53.
3. The government is not precluded from taking title to private property: it may do
so when it is necessary to satisfy a public purpose. When the government does require a
property owner to deed an interest in private property to the government-and it pays the
owner the fair market value of the property-that is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
4. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962).
5. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (upholding city ordinance
banning manufacture of bricks on private property within city limits, even though brick
business was established prior to city annexation of land and ordinance taking effect).
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The police power facilitates planning, encourages public citizenship, and protects social institutions. 6 The state's exercise of its

police power is not considered to be a taking requiring just compensation, except where such regulation goes so far as to be the
functional equivalent of seizure. 7 It is the application of this exception, falling in the middle of the conceptual continuum, which is
the subject of regulatory takings litigation.8
The law of regulatory takings appears to be increasingly protective of private property rights. 9 However, this trend is actually
the result of a splintering of property rights into narrow interests
that are then treated as distinct property rights deserving of full
protection in and of themselves. This splintering, or rationalization,
of property interests may be explained by the court's adoption of
6. See infra text accompanying notes 54-69.
7. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
8. See. e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1986); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340
(1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915).
9. Developments in both federal and state legislation manifest this trend. For
example, in 1993, adopting an approach used in other jurisdictions, Utah passed the Private
Property Protection Act, which requires state agencies to evaluate their regulations to
determine if such regulations could generate constitutional takings. UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 63-90-1 to -4, 63-90a-1 to -4 (Supp. 1995). See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605
(Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-8001 to -8004 (Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN.
2-32 (1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.017 (Vernon Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 4-22§§ 12-

1-201 to -206 (Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.370 (West Supp. 1996);
W. VA. CODE §§ 22-lA-1 to -6 (1994). See also H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(requiring compensation any time property interest is reduced in value by 20% or more);
Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994)
(requiring federal agencies to conduct takings impact analyses to determine whether
federal regulations were resulting in the taking of private property); Recent Legislation,
108 HARv. L. REv. 519, 524 n.3 (1994).
Developments in the judicial arena also demonstrate this trend toward a greater
protection of property. Professor Richard Lazarus points out that landowners get into court
more frequently than they have in the past, but that the Supreme Court is not likely to
rule in their favor. Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 1411, 1415 (1993). His main point, however, is that the Supreme Court was so eager
to confer property rights on landowners in the face of environmental regulation that it
"surmounted a range of obstacles," including problems with ripeness, standing, and the
"sheer improbability of the lower court's factual findings[]" to reach the merits of the
Lucas case. Id. at 1418. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (finding taking of segmented parcel of larger piece of property).
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not only economic analysis of the law, but also economic-or
market-logic in its assumptions about what the law is. Markets
encourage the rationalization, or splintering, of resources into saleable commodities.10 The adoption of market logic to the analysis
of property rights results in the splintering of property into commodifiable interests," without regard to whether it is legally appropriate or valuable to do so.12 Many courts accept that the injury

occasioned by a contested regulation is the property right being
harmed. 13 When property rights are rationalized in this way, courts
can identify the full deprivation of an entire property right in every
case, and require just compensation under the Fifth Amendment
for this regulatory taking.
This trend has begun to erode the police power and, if unchecked, will engulf it. At risk are those exercises of the police
power that protect private property and the economy, not just those
that constrain these social institutions. Taken to its extreme, this
trend will weaken the very governmental authority that protects
private property, as well as the economy that private property makes
possible. A well-developed police power is advantageous to an
economy based on private property because it provides the stability
necessary to promote long-term investment and marketplace risk.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's decisional framework must recognize the police power's beneficial impact on private property.14
A complete understanding of the application of market logic
to the law of regulatory takings requires tracing the roots of this

10. See discussion infra parts IV, V.A.
11. See discussion infra parts IV, V.A.

12. This is a criticism commonly leveled at utilitarian thinking. See STEVEN E.
RHOADS, THE ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF THE WORLD: GOVERNMENT, MARKETS AND PUBLIC

POLICY 62 (1985). Utilitarianism is one philosophical justification for economic and
market logic. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Althone Press 1970) (1823).
13. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 196-197, 200-205.
14. There is a large body of literature exploring the relationship between the
regulatory state and private property. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 144 (1984) (arguing that free markets are
illusionary and that believing pursuit of private interests yields public good is simplistic
utilitarianism); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920 (1982) (arguing that complex-

ity of post-industrial economy requires expansion of administrative capacities in order to
allocate power and protect private property); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing administrative state has become source of wealth, even replacing
private property as main source of wealth for many poorer citizens).
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phenomenon back to the Industrial Revolution and the birth of the
market economy.
From the invention in 1450 of movable type, to the invention
of the cotton gin (which established the cotton industry, the "vehicle of the Industrial Revolution,"'1 to the harnessing of water
power for mills, 16 to the revolutionary line production used for the
Ford Motor Company's Model A, 17 modern Western history has
been the history of the development of a market economy.'" Critical, certainly, to the development of the market economy have been
22
competition, 19 private property, 20 freedom of contract, 21 land, plen24
2
3
tiful resources, and capital. However, possibly the greatest triumph of industrialization and the market economy was the rationalization of production.25 The concept of rationalized production is
the reduction of the production process to its most efficient units,
so that each worker has only to perform a simple, repetitive task.
This increases the efficiency and speed with which that task is
completed, thus greatly increasing the overall volume of commodities that can be produced in a given time period. Therefore, rationalization of production allows the producer to generate a26 supply of
goods sufficient to meet periods of fluctuating demand.
As technology in rationalization of production has advanced,
so, too, has access to commodities: mass production lowers prices,
allowing those of modest income to purchase such commodities
and raise their standard of living.2 7 Indeed, the technology of ra15. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION, THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 37 (1944).
16. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 17801860, at 49-53 (1977) [hereinafter HORWITZ I); Gary Kulik, Dams, Fish, and Farmers,in
& Jonathan
Prud eds., 1985) (arguing Mill Acts damaged subsistence-style economy by reducing fish
available for consumption by farm families).
17. See JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 11-17 (1967).
18. See generally ARNOLD TOYNBEE, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (Beacon 1956)
(1884).
19. See id. at 58-60.
20. See HORWITZ I, supra note 16, at 31-36.
THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE AGE OF CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION (Steven Hahn

21. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW

1870-

1960, at 33-34 (1992) [hereinafter HORWITZ II].
22. See HORWITZ I, supra note 16, at 32-34; POLANYI, supra note 15, at 34-36.
23. See POLANYI, supra note 15, at 41.
24. See GALBRAITH, supra note 17, at 57-58 and n.1.
25. 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 4-8 (ed. 1910 rpt. 1964) [hereinafter
SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS].

26. See id. at 4-9.
27. See generally RHOADS, supra note 12 (discussing change in workers' salaries
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tional production itself gives rise to ideas for new and more affordable commodities.2 8 Thus, rationalization of production has provided the fundamental creative spark of the market: the creation
life easier, more
and production of new commodities that 2make
9
individuals.
to
valuable
more
and
efficient,
These principles of market economics, as well as the philosophy of utilitarianism and the jurisprudence of positive law, contributed to the development of economic analysis of law, 30 an established jurisprudence that has achieved a well-deserved place in
legal thought. 31 The experience of the market economy has rightly

found its way into legal decision-making. 32 Economics has pro-

resulting from industrialization). Professor Rhoads argues that Joseph Singer's automatic
sewing machine did more to provide decent clothing to the masses than did "labor unions
or political reforms." Id. at 93.
28. See 1 SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 8, at 11.
29. Id. at 10-11.
30. Economic analysis of the law finds its intellectual roots in such venerable
authors as Adam Smith, see 1 SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 25 (providing
calculus of efficiency, used in legal disputes to determine whether gainers gain more than
losers lose), Jeremy Bentham, see BENTHAM, supra note 12, at 6-10 (creating framework
for concept of utility, concept of which has been adopted by negligence law and nuisance
law), and even Karl Marx, see I KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL (1867), reprinted in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER 294 (Robert C. Tucker, ed., 2d ed. 1978) (providing law with
framework to discuss redistributive issues in tort and takings law).
31. The earliest examples of cost-benefit analysis in law were 19th- and mid-20thcentury common-law negligence cases. The early cost-benefit procedure was spelled out
in Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl:
The business of life is better carried forward by the use of dangerous
machinery; hence the public good demands its use, although occasionally such
use results in the loss of life or limb. It does so because the danger is
insignificant, when weighed against the benefits resulting from the use of such
machinery, and for the same reason demands its reasonable, most effective,
and unrestricted use, up to the point where the benefits resulting from such
use no longer outweigh the danger to be anticipated from it. At that point the
public goods demands restrictions
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl, 91 N.W. 880, 882-83 (Neb. 1902).
Other early examples of cost-benefit analysis include United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding barge owner contributorily negligent for
failing to keep barge on board vessel; Judge Hand used three variables to make this
determination: "(1) The probability [of the event occurring]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury . . . 3) the burden of adequate precautions."); Davison v. Snohomish County,
270 P. 422 (Wash. 1928); and Stephani v. City of Manitowoc, 62 N.W. 176 (Wis. 1895).
A more complex cost-benefit analysis can be found in modem works such as GUIDO
CALABRESI, COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)
[hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW

(4th ed. 1992); and Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics and the Problem of Legal
Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J. 929.
32. See POSNER, supra note 31.
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34
33
vided the law with such concepts as efficiency, commodities,
incentive, 35 and utility.36 Such concepts have allowed legal deci-

sions to more accurately reflect the nonlegal decisional framework

37
used in both commercial and noncommercial contexts.
However, there is a danger to the integrity of the market itself,
as well as to a clear understanding of the expectations that inform
the law of property, in allowing market logic to inform legal decision-making. Allowing market epistemology to invade spheres of
interaction where it does not belong, it can only result in harm to
what it redefines. 31 Such a phenomenon is occurring as the logic
of rationalization of production has begun to invade land-use planning, specifically regulatory takings and the limits of the police
power. Applying a rationalization of production logic to decisions
about property interests is not constitutionally sound, 39 introduces

33. See, e.g., RHOADS, supra note 12, at 63.
34. See 1 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL (1867), reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 294, 313-19 (Robert C. Tucker, ed., 2d ed. 1978).
35. See RHOADS, supra note 12, at 39-58.
36. Id. at 62.
37. In other words, economic concepts such as these have provided a language to
explain an aspect of interaction that had theretofore gone unnamed: the economic calculus
of interaction. The most obvious example comes from the law of torts, where the
cost/benefit approach to liability issues is well-established. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text. Ideas have been metaphorically referred to as commodities in a
marketplace. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (referring to
"marketplace of ideas"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)
(same). Children have been described as future capital. Jonathan Rauch, Kids as Capital,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1989, at 56. A metaphor that reflects the market calculus is
informative and helpful in understanding an aspect of interaction, both in nonlegal and
legal settings.
38. Adam Smith appreciated the danger of this phenomenon when he advocated that
certain spheres of life be protected from the workings of the market and its mindset. ADAM
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759) [hereinafter SMITH, THEORY OF
MORAL SENTIMENTS] (arguing that civic and religious life must place constraints on
economic conduct). For discussion of the tension between markets and other spheres of
life, see BARBER, supra note 14, at 172-73 (arguing that relying on base motive of material
self-interest "undermines citizenship by compelling [persons] to think privately rather than
publicly and to substitute private for political judgment"); DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL
CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 55 (1976) (arguing Protestant ethic and Puritan temper,
bourgeois systems of values that emphasized work, sobriety, frugality, sexual restraint, and
forbidding attitude toward life were broken down by bourgeois economic system that those
values generated); THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC
OF THE UNITED STATES 295-97 (1979) [hereinafter LowI, END OF LIBERALISM] (arguing
applying market model to politics has caused interest-group liberalism, which in turn has
paralyzed, demoralized, and corrupted democratic government).
39. The framework for deciding what state action is non-compensable is as malleable or as stable as the forces that shape it. The current standard by which owners, states,
and courts test whether an owner is entitled to compensation remains problematic because
it is too changeable to be appropriate for constitutional jurisprudence. Takings decisions
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new uncertainty into private ownership 40 and land use planning, and
ultimately prevents the Fifth Amendment from extending its timehonored protections to private interests that have been regulated

beyond the limits of the police power.41 Thus, the law of regulatory
takings is being overrun by a conceptual framework unsuited to it.
By mirroring the industrialized model it seeks to emulate, takings
jurisprudence grounded in market logic will ultimately become
property interests and will
beholden to splintered and commodified
42
no longer control the rights at stake.
have turned on questions of notice, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984), Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); denominator, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114
S.Ct. 2309 (1994), Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987),
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); economic benefit, Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); expectations, Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), abrogated by First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1986), Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922); invasion, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982);
quasi-invasion, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); nuisance,
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928), Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887); public benefit, PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see also
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1986)
(also based on nuisance). While these are all arguably tenable holdings, even when they
contradict prior holdings without overruling them, the proliferation of doctrinal bases for
takings cases leads to a disconcerting lack of coherence in takings jurisprudence. The
resulting ambiguity and uncertainty may be attributable to the improper infusion of market
logic, rather than traditional precepts of constitutional law into the law of takings. As is
developed later in this Article, these cases all share the same fundamental constitutional
weakness of permitting the dispute to define the constitutional issue, rather than allowing
the Constitution to delimit the dispute. The market logic compensation standard is driven
by owner-defined property interests. If there is an insufficient check on the legitimacy of
the interest defined as a property interest, the constitutional standard will rely too heavily
on the market and not enough on the constant and stable principles that are the hallmark
of constitutional adjudication.
40. The Court currently struggles to find doctrines that will provide guidance to
owners, planners, and state agents. It acknowledges the need for greater predictability
while at the same time admitting the difficulty it has had in establishing predictability
consistent with the dictates of the Constitution. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1986).
41. If it should ever become too difficult to differentiate productively between a
non-compensable regulation and a compensable regulation, it is possible that judges will
either overcompensate or undercompensate. In either case, the lack of standards, which
necessarily imply a value judgment about what is worth protecting and what is not, will
undermine the protection of the Fifth Amendment by reducing important issues of liberty,
security, labor, investment, and occupancy to a calculus of the economic gains and losses
of proposed behavior. Obviously, the takings clause is about much more than fair market
value. A dispute over property interests that involves only the question of exchange value
has taken many important democratic ideals from the equation.
42. As discussed later, the industrialized model is about maximum efficiency,
reduction of production to its most basic component parts, and creation of new commodities and the resources that produce them. Property may be imperiled in an environment
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After discussing the tension between the police power and the
Fifth Amendment in Part I, Part II outlines the history of the
Takings Clause and the police power. Part III briefly posits the
proper role of the regulatory state in using the police power to
order citizen and economic relations. Part IV explores the working
of markets in their conventional sphere: the economy. Part V demonstrates what happens when the state improperly relies on market
logic to make decisions about ordering relations. Part VI shows
how the Supreme Court is constitutionalizing market logic in the
resolution of police power and Fifth Amendment takings disputes
and the problems in allowing markets to define constitutional protections. Part VII proposes a modified framework.
The solution is not simple. The Supreme Court should recognize that its decisional framework has changed and that its new
framework is both unexamined and incomplete. The proper framework should include a responsible understanding of the nature of
"property" and recognition of the police power's role in both limiting and supporting individual rights. To the extent that a regulation checks and supports such rights, it should receive a strong
presumption of constitutionality.
I.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATE'S POLICE POWER

The Fifth Amendment and the police power are in tension in
most land-use planning decisions because, while the police power

distributes benefits and detriments to large groups of people in
order to maximize general welfare, the Fifth Amendment requires

payment to individuals deprived of the use of property even if the
deprivation increases general welfare.
The Fifth Amendment protects the rights of property owners
by requiring compensation for certain burdens upon property, thereby
promoting fairness and protecting autonomy and private incentive.

The Fifth Amendment has protected individuals from having to
bear the burden of the public good by requiring compensation for
takings when it would be more fair to spread the burden to the

public at large.43 Thus, when the government forced a hardware

like this. Property relies on wholeness and stability for its continued vitality. Market logic
undermines this wholeness and stability if left unmonitored.
43. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)
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store owner to dedicate a bike path across her property because
heavier traffic might result from the expansion of the store, the
state's interest in decongesting traffic was insufficiently strong to
overcome her private property right. 44 Similarly, when a property
owner lost the right to build a home on the beach after legislation
was redrawn to include his parcels of land in the coastal protection
area, the Supreme Court refused to recognize this as a valid exercise of the police power without the state's showing either that the
right to build the homes would be proscribed by the state's nuisance law or that the right to build the homes had never inhered
in the title. 45 Without such a showing, the land owner would have
been required to contribute too heavily to the preservation of the
beach; virtually all nearby owners had been permitted to build on
46
their lots.
Furthermore, by requiring payment for the imposition of certain burdens on private property, the Fifth Amendment protects
autonomy. 47 Autonomy denotes the authority to make and carry out
48
choices based on criteria generated by the deciding individual.
The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects
autonomy by providing a buffer-the requirement of payment-between the owner and the government entity. This buffer causes

("[Tihis Court has recognized that the 'Fifth Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to

bar government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.

) (quoting Armstrong

v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
44. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2322 (1994).

45. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1988).
46. Id. at 1029-31.
47. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), was decided partly on
the ground that the private owners of the homes-which were threatened by mine

subsidence and protected from further threat by the disputed statute-had exercised their

freedom of contract in purchasing the house without the right to subsurface support. This

autonomy would be lost if the statute took away that for which they had bargained. Id. at
413-14. Justice Holmes seemed to take the view that the freedom to make bad decisions

was part of being a citizen in a constitutional democracy. Id. at 416. Similarly, a developer
was found to have bargained for the right to sell the exclusivity right in the private marina
dug by it, thus defeating the claim for public access by the Army Corps of Engineers.

Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). Without the ability to market the
homes on Kuapa Pond as completely exclusive, the developer would have lost an
important, and arguably the most profitable, element in the venture: the autonomy to sell

access. See id. at 179-80.
48. See ROBERT N.

BELLAH, ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND

COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 23 (1985) (exploring relationship between freedom and
autonomy).
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sufficient pause in state action to allow the majority of decisions
49
by the owner to stand unchallenged.
By requiring that the state engage in an exchange with individuals when it wishes to advance the public interest, the Constitution has profoundly changed the power relationships between the
state and the individual.5 0 This shift of power from the state to the
individual acts as a self-imposed limitation on legitimate state

coercion; this limitation is central to the modem conception of
1
5
private property.

Finally, the Fifth Amendment also protects private incentive.
Incentive derives from the knowledge that an owner will be able
to produce more than she can consume with her property, sell this
surplus, and profit by the endeavor.5 2 This requires security of
possession so that an owner perceives a reduced risk in investing
capital over time. Incentive is not, however, only a product of
profit-making. Incentives toward nonprofit enterprises, such as private home ownership, are similarly facilitated by the Fifth Amendment. Persons are encouraged to purchase, maintain, and improve
their residences, knowing that the state may intervene in only the
5 3
rarest of circumstances.
49. Many cases (not just in the takings context) indicate that the actual decision
made is not to be second guessed, but rather scrutinized only for its compliance with
statutory and constitutional principles. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); City of Phoenix v. Beall, 524 P.2d 1314
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); Landgrave v. Watson 593 S.W.2d 875 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Kropf
v. City of Sterling Heights, 215 N.W.2d 179 (Mich. 1974). In FirstEnglish, the California
Court of Appeal on remand denied permission for a church to rebuild in what was declared
a flood plain. Compensation was not awarded on the grounds that the denial was made for
public safety reasons. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
50. This is complicated by an expanded definition of "individual" that includes
corporations. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. W.G. Ward, Jr., 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9
(1985).
51. The older, Blackstonian view of property saw the sovereign as the ultimate fee
owner, even if the beneficial owner never thought about the sovereign during his life. This
is precisely the view that Locke challenged in his work. Locke saw the person who worked
the land and made it productive as the only person who had any moral or legal claim
against deprivation. The sovereign's only role was to protect that claim. See JOHN LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 27 (C.B. Macpherson, ed., 1980) (1690); Alan
Ryan, Locke, Labour and the Purposes of God, in PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 17
(1984).
52. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 32 & n.1 (stating private property is necessary
to create incentive and protect profit).
53. The security interest is paramount in writings contemporary to the adoption of
the Constitution and Bill of Rights. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay), No. 7
(Alexander Hamilton). Equality of power to purchase property almost certainly was not
favored. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
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Thus, basic values like fairness, autonomy, incentive, and security
inform the jurisprudential framework that supports individual rights
in the area of property ownership.
In contrast, the police power facilitates planning, encourages
public citizenship, and protects social institutions. Facilitation of
planning 54 is evident in the seminal case of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,5 5 where the Supreme Court found that a zoning
plan did not effect a taking even though the aggrieved party would
not be permitted to use its property for industrial purposes, its most
profitable use. The Supreme Court suggested that the zoning plan
benefited everyone in the long run, increasing the value of respective uses of property by juxtaposing them compatibly.5 6 Where the
police power properly facilitates planning, it results in orderly legal
relationships among property owners.5 7 This is an appropriate and
58
primary role of the state in a complex constitutional democracy.
The police power also encourages public citizenship.5 9 Valid ex-

ercise of the power provides the framework for private action, whether

to establish the roof pitch necessary to carry the local snow load60
or to determine the limits of private restaurant capacity. 61 To the
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 75-79 (1990).
Once acquired, however, "the most humble citizen in the land is entitled to identically the
same protection accorded to the master of the most gorgeous palace." Bove v. DonnerHanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 235 (N.Y App. Div. 1932).
54. See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS 6 (W.S. Hein 1981) (1904) (stating that "[t]he state places its corporate and
proprietary resources at the disposal of the public by the establishment of improvements
and services of different kinds....
55. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
56. See id. Accord William K. Jones, Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of
Takings, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 40 (1995).
57. See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
58. SKOWRONEK, supra note 14, at 27-29.
59. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980), in which
the Supreme Court refused to find a Fifth Amendment taking when the California Supreme
Court determined that the California Constitution required a shopping center owner to
provide access to its premises to a group wishing to exercise its right of free expression.
To the extent that the Court balanced property and First Amendment rights, the outcome
clearly indicates that the owner's passive, if reluctant, participation in the political activity
of the group was a tolerable side effect of the Fifth Amendment dispute. See also Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (requiring brewery owner to suffer uncompensated loss of
livelihood in light of evil of alcohol production and consumption). Even Blackstone
recognized the state's role in protecting private property via nuisance law. 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *217.
60. See Wright v. State Bd. of Eng'g Examiners, 250 N.W. 2d 412 (Iowa 1977)
(finding failure to follow building code requirement that roofs be designed for snow load
not less than 30 pounds per square foot sufficient to revoke engineers' registration).
61. See Burke v. Denison, 630 N.YS. 2d 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (affirming
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extent that the police power defines the public implications of a
private act, it helps to define the role of the citizen in the republic. 62
The police power's role in protecting social institutions is less
commonly recognized. It is the layer between order and chaos. 63
The police power has protected food supplies, 64 historic buildings, 65
the structural integrity of the earth, 66 wetlands,
tions, 68 and even endangered species. 69

67

pension contribu-

The tension between the benefits and burdens of the police
power and the benefits and burdens of the Takings Clause has been
extremely contentious for only about half of the United States'
history. It would be well to explore the historical context within
which the Clause arose in order to understand the constraints of
its workings today.

distinction between "sit down" and "take out/carry out" restaurants for determining
parking spaces needed to accommodate anticipated seating demand); Off Shore Restaurant
Corp. v. Linden, 322 N.YS. 2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) (affirming denial of variance
to increase seating capacity of restaurant is violative of zoning ordinance's goal to provide
adequate parking for commercial establishments).
62. Citizenship is here broadly defined. See generally BELLAH, supra note 48, at
200-01 (positing three different, and sometimes contradictory, American conceptions of
citizenship: implementing moral consensus of community; pursuing differing interests; and
transcending individual interests in national affairs).
63. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926) ("suppression and prevention of disorder"); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
420 (1922) ("If the public safety is imperiled, surely neither grant, nor contract, can prevail
against the exercise of the police power.') (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). These cases discuss the need to prevent incompatible uses
such as children playing near industrial sites, people residing near factories omitting
offensive fumes, or coal mining beneath structures that might collapse.
64. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (apple trees).
65. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (Grand
Central Station).
66. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (subsurface subsidence); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (sand and gravel
excavation below water table).
67. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (fill
permit).
68. Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (pension contributions); Connolly v.
Pension Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (pension contributions).
69. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S.Ct
2407 (1995) (construing Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19),
1538(a)(1)(B) (1994)).
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II. HISTORY OF TENSION BETWEEN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND
THE POLICE POWER

A. Historical Context of Takings
1. The TraditionalFramework: The Early Cases
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment arose in an his70
torical context where governmental seizure of land was disfavored.
Colonial views of ownership were a reaction to the feudal tenure
system of property rights, which provided no ultimate ownership
to those who lived on and worked the land. 71 Colonial America
protected certain basic freedoms rarely enjoyed in Europe,7 2 especially freedom from the physical seizure of property by the sovereign.7 3 While regulation and dedication of property for the greater
good were unoffensive to colonial citizens, the idea that a person
could make a commitment to the land, work it, reside on it, raise
a family there, and otherwise treat it as his own-but be unable to
exercise ultimate legal authority over it-was an affront to the
colonial notion of ordered liberty.74 It was a view more consistent
with the newer Lockean theory of ownership based on labor and
investment,7 5 and the Hegelian derivation of property rights from
the philosophy of personhood. 76 In the colonial view, protection of
70. See generally FRED P BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 53-104 (1973)
(exploring English roots of permissible property regulation and their relationship to Colonial

rules); William M. Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 700 (1985) (noting that although
interferences were more invasive than would be tolerated today, interferences were inoffensive
because of perception interference was for public good rather than for royal good).
71. See NEDELSKY, supra note 53, at 280 n.7; JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW:
RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 503-14 (1993).

72. See Marvin E. Frankel, Faith and Freedom-Religious Liberty in America, 5
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 127, 127 (1995) (book review) (religion); Kira A. Larson, Recent Case,
37 DRAKE L. REV. 753, 760 (1987) (religion); Arthur K. Steinberg, A.G. Roeber, Palatines,

Liberty, and Property: German Lutherans in Colonial British America, 39 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 239 (1995) (book review) (referring generally to experience of greater freedom than
that experienced in Europe); Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Legal History of the Family, 85 MICH.
L. REv. 1052, 1054 (1987) (reviewing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985)) (economic and social
freedoms for women).
73. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 70, at 76.
74. See NEDELSKY, supra note 53, at 186.
75. E.g., LOCKE, supra note 51, at §§ 27-28; RYAN, supra note 51, at 17.
76. See Margaret J. Radin, Propertyand Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971-78

(1982) [hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood].
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property rights could be both more deferential to incidental regulation and use of property by the government, and less tolerant of
the loss of liberty interests associated with the tenurial property
system of England. It may be difficult to comprehend the self-imposed limits on private property from the vantage point of modern
society, however, because conceptions of property and property
7
rights have expanded far beyond those originally contemplated.
The Fifth Amendment protections clearly seem to have been
intended for overt government expropriation of improved real property.78 While there is some disagreement over whether the Clause
79
was intended to protect real property or realty and personalty,
there is little evidence that the eighteenth-century view of property
extended beyond physical conceptions of property.80 This limit is
the power of eminent domain: an individual may not prevent the
seizure of her property by the government-so long as it is for a
public purpose 81-but the loss to the individual must be compen82
sated justly.
Regulations and the exercise of the power of eminent domain
were less common occurrences in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries because the state apparatus was much smaller
and weaker than it became in the mid-twentieth century.8 3 Further77. See William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 824 (1995) (arguing that vastly fewer
interests were protected as property at and after the adoption of the Fifth Amendment);
Treanor, Note, supra note 70, at 695. Thus, it was common for land to be taken without
compensation in order to build roads, for example, but the individual colonial charters or
legislative acts provided for procedural protections if the state took private, improved
property. Id. at 695 n.6; see also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 70, at 85.
78. Treanor, Original Understanding, supra note 77, at 791-96.
79. Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. REV. 531
(1995) (arguing that there is no defensible distinction between protection of real property
interests and personal property interests).
80. Id. at 540 n.32 and accompanying text; PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL
POSITIONS 6-9 (C.B. Macpherson, ed., 1978) (pointing out property came to include both
things and land with advent of market economy in late 17th century).
Although contemporaneous debate over the amendment is scarce, see Clegg, supra
note 79, at 540; Treanor, Original Understanding, supra note 77, at 791, early cases
recognize this limit, see Treanor, Original Understanding, supra note 77, at 792.
81. See NEDELSKY, supra note 53, at 232 (discussing broad interpretation of public
use); contra Clegg, supra note 79, at 542-43 (arguing that text of amendment does not
support interpretation that private property is available for public purpose, but rather use
only).
82. See, e.g., NEDELSKY, supra note 53, at 233-34.
83. "In this historical circumstance [of the American Revolution against concentrated state power], there were no acceptable models for the construction of an effective
state power." SKOWRONEK, supra note 14, at 20.
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more, the eighteenth-century view of protectable property interests
was more unified because it depended more upon a physical conception of property than is true today.8 4 For example, original state
charters failed to provide for compensation in the event of a taking
of unimproved, unenclosed property; 85 compensation clauses in modem state constitutions reflect the federal Constitution, but the Compensation Clause of the federal Constitution was considered an
86
innovation in its time.

Today, though most agree that the Takings Clause was a
Madisonian idea, commentators are divided on exactly what the

Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause was meant to protect.

7

The papers of the Constitutional Convention provide little

illumination, 8 and history simply does not support an argument
that the Framers had reached a consensus on constitutional protection of private property ownership among the colonies. 9 Of those
colonies that provided protection, they provided for procedural due
process, but not compensation. Others provided no protection at

all. 90 One commentator has suggested that the ambiguity of the Just
Compensation Clause was born of a contest between the values of

republicanism, which emphasized the collective good, and the values of liberalism, which focused upon the value of the individual. 9 1

Perhaps another way of conceiving of the tension is to focus on
84. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 70, at 106.

85. Massachusetts was the exception; it compensated private property owners even
if the land taken for a state road was unimproved. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 70,

at 95-97; Treanor, Original Understanding, supra note 77, at 786. See also Clegg, supra
note 79, at 538-40.
86. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 70, at 94-97 (noting only one state

constitution had compensation clause-Massachusetts-and that Vermont's legislature
enacted clause but it was never ratified by citizens).
87. See NEDELSKY, supra note 53, at 28-30, 232 (arguing Fifth Amendment was
meant to prevent unlanded masses from wresting holdings from wealthy landowners);
Treanor, Original Understanding, supra note 77, at 818 (reflecting change from republicanism to perception of need to protect liberal values); Clegg, supra note 79, at 539
(arguing Clause was incorporated to secure the liberty of politically weak).
88. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 70, at 99-100.

89. See Clegg, supra note 79, at 538; Treanor, Original Understanding, supra note
77, at 791.
90. Maryland, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, New Hampshire, and
Pennsylvania required only that the legislature consent to the seizure of private property.
Delaware, Georgia, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and South Carolina (in their first
constitutions) made no reference to the issue at all. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 70, at

97. See also id., at 94-98 & nn.48-54.
91. See Treanor, Note, supra note 70, at 708; Treanor, Original Understanding,
supra note 77, at 819.
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the uncertainty over the role of the state in private affairs. In order
to give effect to the rights of private property the state had to

actively protect such rights (as a "night-watchman state").9 2 Yet by
taking positive action the state was invading a province where it
did not belong. As conceptions of property and legitimate governmental activity have developed through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate
state action has become more difficult to discern. 93
While the rights of private property owners in the eighteenth
century and the early nineteenth century found full vindication
only upon physical confiscation of land, 94 the mid-nineteenth century saw the exercise of eminent domain gradually expand from
actual seizure to a seizure effected by making the property useless.
This is distinguishable as "constructive" eminent domain: physical
invasion without expropriation. 95 This scheme created a small class
of additional forms of state action from which private property
owners would receive the protection of compensation. 96 This new
conception of eminent domain was a narrow expansion of the
rights of property owners. It required both a physical invasion and
a direct effect on the land to justify compensation. For example,
the government's building a dam and permanently flooding the
complaining landowner's pasture, thereby rendering it absolutely
useless to the landowner, constituted constructive eminent domain. 97
92. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26-27 (1974).

93. The takings issue has been described as "intractible" "irresolvable," and even
as the equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark. Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the
Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Taking Analysis,
70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 92 & n.2 (1995) (quoting CHARLES HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING
766 (3d ed. 1976)).
94. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 70, at 106. See, e.g., Coates v. New York,
7 Cow. 585, 605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (upholding validity of state statute authorizing City
of New York to prohibit interment of dead bodies on certain lands within city, despite
rights held under grants or titles to land held in trust for sole purpose of interment, some
of which land had been used for that purpose for over 100 years; stating, "No property
has, in this instance, been entered upon or taken.").
95. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
96. Until the Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause was incorporated to apply
to the States, the concept of state action extended only so far as the federal government.
E.g., Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84 (1857); Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). Incorporation occurred in Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. City of
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
97.
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result if, in construing a
provision of constitutional law . . . it shall be held that if the government
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This framework found its doctrinal legitimacy in nuisance law and
was compatible with the practice of compensating someone for an
action that interfered with the common law right of quiet enjoyment. This practice continued to treat the takings issue as one of

kind, and not, as in later cases, one of degree, for even under the
constructive eminent domain analysis there was a class of governmental activity that constituted the exercise of eminent domain and

thus required compensation; no other action qualified for such
treatment. 98 The general trend, though incremental, was to view

discrete interests as interests requiring protection under the Constitution. 99 This was primarily because the proliferation of property

uses in an industrial market economy also encouraged increased
recognition of discrete property interests.100
An early Supreme Court case, Mugler v. Kansas,'0 ' recognizes

this "new classification" of abstracted property interests, noting the
possibility of a protected interest severed from the realty itself.

Mugler held that regulation of land use that forbids an activity
because it causes injury to the community is not a compensable
taking of private property for public use. 10 2 Mugler was unable to
manufacture beer in Kansas after the state passed a statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor. Mugler's plant was virtually useless for any other purpose, yet the Supreme Court denied
compensation because the exercise of the police power was valid. 0 3
This was so because the statute neither affected his title to the
refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public
it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable permanent injury to any
extent, can in effect, subject it to total destruction without making any
compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of the word, it is not taken for
the public use.
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871) (emphasis in original)
98. It is always true that the degree of noxiousness is the criterion for placement in
the class. See, e.g., Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 17 (1915) (livery stable); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brickyard).
99. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871); The Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) (entertaining but rejecting takings claim for loss of
value of money).
100. See generally HoRwiTz I, supra note 16 (arguing evolution of property law
followed general economic trend, favoring more technologically advanced uses over more
agrarian or less intensive ones).
101. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
102. Id. at 668-69.
103. Id. at 664 (rejecting as irrelevant Mugler's allegation that his establishment
would have no value because Kansas might lawfully prohibit manufacture and sale of
intoxicating liquors as legitimate exercise of police power).
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property, nor any lawful use of the property, 0 4 and did not result
in the government's use of the property. 10 5 This suggests that the
Supreme Court had become cognizant of a view of property abstracted from its physical nature. 06 "Injurious use," or a regulation
of use that does not affect title, is conceptually more abstract than
the idea of a physical parcel of land. 07 Later cases consistently
follow Mugler, requiring compensation only for appropriations of
property for the taker's own use. 108 This is consistent with the
evolving classification scheme of abstracted property interests discussed above.
2. Creative Strains: The Late Nineteenth- and Early
Twentieth-Century Analysis

Perhaps because of the increased individual rights granted
through the broad, sweeping language of the Fourteenth Amendment'0 9 or perhaps because of the expansion of federal and state
governments," 0 the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
experienced a growing tension between private property ownership
and governmental regulation. The seminal case of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon"' launched a new era of governmental regulation of land use and redefined the parameters delimiting governmental action. Mahon established a new threshold for a regulatory

104. Mugler retained both the rights of exclusion and alienation. See id. at 669.
105. See id. at 668-69. See also BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 70, at 120.
106. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (discussing possible distinctions
between exercise of police power that destroys a public nuisance, prohibition of use of
property that diminishes its value, or "taking away" property from "innocent" owner
without due process).
107. See HORwITZ II, supra note 21, at 11-16.
108. See, e.g., New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453
(1905) (disallowing takings challenge for expense incurred by railroad in being forced to
destroy and rebuild bridge in order to accommodate new public drainage plan); Chicago,
B. & Q.R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 "(1897) (disallowing takings challenge
by railroad required to keep its facilities at standard that would maintain public health and
safety).
109. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-35
(1897) (applying Fifth Amendment protections to states through Fourteenth Amendment).
110. It was at this point that the Industrial Revolution, with its acceleration of
productivity and fragmentation of labor, created a perceived need for mediation among
increasingly complex corporate and individual interests. See SKOWRONEK, Supra note 14,
at 11-12.
111. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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taking by recognizing takings that consist of confiscation of less
112
than the entire parcel of property.

The Mahon case transformed the takings question into an issue
of degree, not kind, as had earlier been the case." 3 The decision
also left the lower courts with little guidance as to the standards
necessary to engage in informed decision-making;11 4 the situation
has not changed significantly to this day. 115 The dissenting opinion
counseled against any attempt to place a value on lost profit outside
the context of the value of the entire property." 6 However, the
majority opinion looked at the complete loss of particular coal as
7
a property right in and of itself."
Mahon involved a dispute over the validity of a statute, the
Kohler Act, 8 which prohibited coal companies from excavating
certain coal, the removal of which would compromise the stability
of the earth beneath erected structures. At issue in Mahon was a
coal company's property right to the unfettered use of the mineral
and support estates it owned beneath a family home. The home112. Id. at 414-15.

113. See supra text accompanying notes 94-108. See also HORWITZ II, supra note
21, at 17-19.
114. After Mahon, the Supreme Court decided Village of Euclid v. Amber Reality
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); and Nectow v.
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Then it virtually stopped deciding land use cases until
the early 1970s. But see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). None of these cases
gives a great deal of substantive guidance.
115.
It is no answer to say that "[a]fter all, if a policeman must know the
Constitution, then why not a planner?". To begin with, the Court has repeatedly recognized that it itself cannot establish any objective rules to assess
when a regulation becomes a taking. How then can it demand that land
planners do any better? However confusing some of our criminal procedure
cases may be, I do not believe they have been as open-ended and standardless
as our regulatory takings cases are.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 340
n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec.
Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661, n.26 (1981)) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
116. This approach presaged, among other cases, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), in which a very similar statute was found not to
be a taking at all.
117. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922). One area of
debate in takings jurisprudence is how to define the property that is being regulated. See
NEDELSKY, supra note 53, at 236; Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:
Cross-Currentsin the Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667 (1988) [hereinafter Radin, Liberal Conception of Property].
118. Act of May 27, 1921 (P.L. 1198) (current amended version at 52 PA. CoNs.
STAT. § 661 (1996)).
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owners, whose title included only the surface estate, argued that
the coal company's mining of these subsurface estates would destabilize the earth below their home and thus violate the Kohler Act.
The Supreme Court found the Kohler Act to be an impermissible
infringement on the coal company's property right in the mineral
and support estate.119 The dissent disagreed, defining the mining as
a prohibited noxious use and arguing that public safety was paramount over the private rights to property and contract. 120
The case was essentially an economic analysis of the interaction between governmental authority and private individuals; the
core assumption being the primacy of private rights and freedom
of contract over public benefit. The state could, without payment,
control private land use without actually dispossessing the landowner. However, if such control went "too far," it would constitute
a taking and require payment of compensation or invalidation of
the law. 21 The opinion also institutionalized the "diminution in
value" test 22 and the case-by-case analysis of the takings issue. 23
Mahon ties "economic viability," both historically and logically, into the state's changing perception of private property. This
Article has argued that the Takings Clause is being redefined by
market logic, which more frequently forces the state into an exchange with private property owners to protect ever narrower property interests. This constitutionally mandated exchange, though not
absolutely preventing takings, effectively protects private property
owners from state control, by forcing the state to step into the
economy where it is motivated to rationally maximize its utility.124
Thus, the state has economic incentives to exercise restraint in
promulgating regulations that impact property interests, as the market definition of narrow property interests will require compensation in most cases. This protection accorded to private property has
facilitated the growth of the American economic system into its
present form. However, the state may also act in an economically
rational manner by justifying the regulation as a valid exercise of
119.
120.
121.
122.

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
Id. at 417-18 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 415.
Id. at 413. See discussion infra part VI.A.3 regarding the diminution in value

test.
123. Id.

124. To the extent that the state is acting like an economic entity.
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the police power, the "implied limitation" 125 to which private property rights are subject, such that compensation is not required.
Thus, both the state's reduction in promulgating regulations that
would require compensating property owners, and the state's justification for regulating the use of private property may be in service to
itself as a rational economic actor.
B. Historical Context of the Police Power
Time and tradition institutionalized the weakness of the nineteenth-century state.12 6 The need for a stronger administrative state
developed as a result of industrialization and urbanization. However, as decisions in the 1920s and 1930s ultimately conceded, the
best workable model was the regulatory state; this new, stronger
government required the courts to give deference to the legislatures
in struggling to manage ever more complex relations among competing actors. A stronger administrative state was not forthcoming
in the early twentieth century, due in part to the Supreme Court's
active restriction of the social and economic legislation that is the
domain and evidence of a strong state.12 7 The Supreme Court restricted such legislation for traditional reasons, as was evidenced
by the Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon decision of that period. The
majority opinion in Mahon reflects the desire to maintain a minimalist state and unstructured relations among individuals and between individuals and government, 128 while the dissent advocates
more structured social and economic relations to meet the needs
of an increasingly complex society that can only be achieved by a
125. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
126. Stephen D. Krasner, Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and
HistoricalDynamics, 16 COMP. POL. 223, 235 (1984).
127.

With substantive due process, the Court asserted that the judiciary itself was
the only reliable bastion of rational policy making in this volatile democracy.
With constitutional laissez-faire, the Court sought to sharpen the boundaries
between the public and private spheres, to provide clear and predictable
standards for gauging the scope of acceptable state action, and to affirm with

the certainty of fundamental law the prerogatives of property owners in the
marketplace.
SKOWRONEK, supra note 14, at 41. Accord HORWITZ II, supra note 21, at 222.

128. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1992).
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larger, more active state apparatus. 129 This historical context has
had a tremendous impact on Fifth Amendment cases from Mahon
to the present.
The case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 13exercised
the police power more broadly than it had previously been exercised in the regulatory context.' In Euclid, the Court upheld the
state's ability to regulate the use of private property through its
police power. Euclid involved a dispute over the constitutionality
of a comprehensive zoning plan that downzoned a significant portion of Ambler Realty's parcel from industrial to medium- and
high-density residential, and institutional. 32 The Supreme Court
upheld the facial validity of the plan. Justice Sutherland, writing
for the majority, reasoned that regulating uses under a comprehensive zoning plan was analogous to regulating nuisances. Zoning
would prevent "a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the
parlor instead of the barnyard."1 33
In sum, the constitutionality of the police power is undisputed.
Yet some constitutional limitations on the police power in land use
regulation are also undisputed. The scope of that power or, alternatively, the limitations on it, has been the source of extensive
litigation, numerous "tests," and unmitigated confusion, as courts
and commentators struggle with the cryptic legacy of Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon.
III. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY

Clearly the state has a role to play in private affairs, although
there is no consensus regarding how large a role it should play.1 34
129. Id. at 422 ("[T]he advantage of living and doing business in a civilized
community") (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
130. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
131. Id.

132. Id.

133. Id. at 388.
134. There are far too many political and legal ideologies and philosophies to
discuss even superficially in this Article; such a task is far beyond its scope. Between
libertarianism and state communism are myriad gradations of the nature and extent of
appropriate state intervention in private affairs. For the libertarian view, see NozIcK, supra

note 92 (basing his argument of historical entitlement on the ground that no rights in
property accrue except by actions or transactions); for the socialist view, compare LUDWIG
VON MISES, SOCIALISM (2d ed. 1951) (arguing centrally controlled allocation of scarce
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Legal commentary tends to focus on the state's role in providing
security and orderliness of relationships among parties. 135 Welfare
economists view the role of the state in the private economy as one
of allocation, distribution, and stabilization. 136 To the extent that
these roles are legitimate, it is necessary to explain each of these
roles before discussing how market logic is transforming them.
A. Security
The state provides security for private property interests in
several ways. For example, it promotes national security 37 and
commercial relations with foreign governments,' 38 which helps to
secure private rights. 139 This protects life, liberty, and property from
hostile foreign governments.
Domestically, protection of the life, liberty, and property of citizens is seen as a proper role for the state to. play even by the most
libertarian of ideologies. 140 From the authority of Congress to maintain
a military force' 4 ' and establish and maintain treaties with foreign
nations,

42

to the right to bear arms, 143 one role of the state has

always been to provide active protection to its citizens and to allow
citizens to protect themselves from others, including the state.
Through substantive criminal law, the state secures person and
property from unwanted invasions of property. 44 Statutes prohibitresources would lead to inefficient or even catastrophic results) with Oskar Lange, On the
Economic Theory of Socialism, in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 57 (Benjamin E. Lippincot ed., 1938) (arguing that central control of property can achieve efficient
allocation of resources).
135. FREUND, supra note 54, at 6.
136. RHOADS, supra note 12, at 61.

137. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.
138. 'The Congress shall have Power to

. . . regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes:' U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, ci. 1, 3.
139. Case law shows that the dispute about whether individual state governments
have a role to play is resolved in favor of unified national security, see, e.g., United States
v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 522 (1975), and unified regulations of foreign commerce, see,
e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979), Michelin Tire

Corp. v. Wages, Tax Comm'r, 423 U.S. 276, 286 (1979).
140. See NoZICK, supra note 92, at 26-27 (arguing state's role is in self-defense of
attacks on life, liberty, and property, though protection may have to be remunerated).

141.
142.
143.
144.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 13.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, el. 1.
See U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
E.g., Aiuz. REv.STAT. ANN. § 13-1504 (1995) (criminal trespass); ILL. ANN.
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ing criminal trespass, breaking and entering, vandalism, and burglary are examples of criminal law protections for private property.
These safeguards for private property interests are codified by leg-

47
islatures, 145 executed by police forces, 146 and vindicated by courts.1
Procedural protections such as the right against unlawful searches
and seizures are another protection afforded to, among other interests, private property. At the same time, and even in the context of

the same crimes, individuals have the right to call upon the state

to honor procedural protections to property, namely, the right to be
free of unlawful searches and seizures. 148 The right to be free of

such unlawful searches and seizures of property are similarly imposed on all three branches of government. 49 The legitimacy of the
state gives life to this protection and ultimately provides security
of possession to the owner.
In civil matters, individual state governments are the first and
last arbiters of the nature and extent of private property rights.150
John Locke saw a primary role for the state to play in protecting
private property from others and from the state itself.15' Even Blackstone viewed the state as the last forum for vindication of private
STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/21-1.2 (Smith-Hurd 1995) (institutional vandalism); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-14-403 (1995) (aggravated burglary).
145. See supra note 144.
146. The domain of the police in controlling criminal conduct is so extensive that
there are even statutes regulating the degree of self-help or vigilantism permitted outside
the executive branch. E.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-503 (Baldwin 1996) (requiring
judicial permission to ask police officer to sanction or assist in the execution of self-help
repossession). See, e.g., People v. Boyd, 474 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), aff'd 511
N.Y.S.2d 455 (N.Y App. Div. 1987), appeal denied, 507 N.E.2d 1094 (N.Y. 1987) (treating
private individuals who engage in self-help in assisting police as police agents).
147. In addition to the fact-finding and sentencing functions of courts in hearing
and punishing crimes against property, courts have also been called on to interpret the
scope of the executive branch. Some have encouraged state action and discouraged private
action. See, e.g., First and Farmers Bank of Somerset, Inc. v. Henderson, 763 S.W.2d 137,
141 (1988) (finding creditor must seek judicial intervention if using police officer to assist
in repossession).
148. This right is found in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and in similarly worded provisions of State constitutions. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
149. In the context of search warrant requirements, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 933.19 (West 1995); MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 300-125 (West 1995); S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 17-13-140 (Law. Co-op 1995); Connecticut v. Trine, 657 A.2d 675 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995)
(suppressing contraband evidence seized after completion of protective patdown search);
Illinois v. Mitchell, 614 N.E.2d 1213 (Ill. 1993) (admitting such evidence); North Carolina
v. Powell, 181 S.E.2d 754 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971).
150. As Justice Scalia pointed out in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992): "South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance
and property law that prohibit the uses [Lucas] now intends... "'
151. See Ryan, supra note 51, at 15 (citing John Locke, Two TREATISES ON
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rights, 52 as well as the forum for legitimating the rights between
private and state actors. 153 One of the most traditional rights in
private property, the right to exclude others, is protected by all
three arms of the American state: it is codified in state trespass
laws and enforced by state law enforcement agents; 154 and vindicated in the courts. 155 It is ultimately the legitimacy of this police
power that gives meaning and life to this right to exclude-the
security interest that is vital to the integrity of private property.
Legitimacy is the final recourse for the modem state. Max
Weber has pointed out that the state can operate as it does-with
a large discrepancy between the number of police and citizensprecisely because the majority of the population consents to the
limits that these arms of the state represent1 56 If the state loses
legitimacy by exercising power arbitrarily or unjustly, its police
force can be outnumbered by the population and can no longer
control it. The rules fail when those who have been charged with
enforcing them can no longer impose the laws on a population that
ignores law in numbers too large to be punished. Thus, the legitimacy of the police power is the final arbiter of the right to exclude.
B. Orderliness of Relationships
Apart from enforcing basic security rights, the state protects
private property by ordering relationships between private actors.
Either before or after private relationships break down, the state
must step in to establish the limits of private action.15 7 The maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas5 1governs the resolution of land
GOVERNMENT II, § 123); Donald A. Krueckeberg, The Difficult Characterof Property 61

J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 301, 303-04 (1995).
152. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at *217-*218 (authorizing chancery to protect

the use and quiet enjoyment rights of owners as against persons committing nuisances).
153. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at *3.
154. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 259.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994) (trespass

on park, camp grounds); S.C. CODE ANN. § 54-13-30 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (trespass on
privately owned docks).
155. E.g., Chase v. Chase, 15 Nev. 259 (1880); New Jersey v. Wouters, 177 A.2d

299 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962).
156. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY

AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE

SOCIOLOGY 212-15 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) [hereinafter WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY].
157. FREUND, supra note

54, at 6.
158. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492
(1987) ("[U]se your own property in such manner as not to injure that of another").
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use conflicts, whether in planning future relationships or in settling
159
fractured ones.
The law of nuisance was one of the earliest adjudicatory frameworks for settling land use disputes unrelated to trespass. 160 Even
a lawful use of property could be enjoined if it was injurious to
another's land. 161 Nuisance law provided a retroactive mechanism
through which the state could reorder the legal relationships between disgruntled landowners.' 62 Nuisance law also provided an
early analytical framework for the exercise of the state police
63
power to order the legal relations among landowners.1
The criminal law is similarly full of prohibitions on private
action that impermissibly infringe on the property rights of others.
Laws against criminal trespass, vandalism, loitering, and burglary
are some examples of legislative value judgments of the importance of property rights. They order legal relationships by defining
the limits of private conduct in relation to property owners. Whatever conduct a property owner may be required to expect, she is
not required to countenance unauthorized entry, destruction of property, and unwanted persons on her premises. 64 These expectations,
created by the criminal law, establish a sense of order in the ownership of private property.
Thus, the law of nuisance and the criminal law are other legal
arenas in which the values of private property receive indirect
recognition and protection. Criminal statutes and nuisance law protect private property by establishing or resolving the legal relationships among owners.
159. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at *3.
160. See id. at *2.
161. See id.
162. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 100-02 (3d ed. 1993).

163. See 3 BLACKSTONE supra note 59, at *217-*218; Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926): "[T]he law of nuisances ... may be consulted
... for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of the
[police] power." See, e.g., Daniel A. Ippolito, Comment, An Originalist's Evaluation of

Modem Takings Jurisprudence,26 SETON HALL L. REV. 317, 331 (1995) (asserting that
compensation requirement of Fifth Amendment is constitutionalization of Blackstonian
views on nuisance law); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings

Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1635-38 (arguing for Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence informed primarily by law of nuisance). See also Bove V.
Donner-Hanke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932) (finding woman who
bought home in area that subsequently became heavily industrialized and later zoned
industrial had no cause of action in nuisance against neighboring owner that operated coke
factory).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 144-149.
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C. Allocation, Distribution,and Stabilization
If the state performs any function beyond providing defense
and preserving order, it is to decide who receives resources, how
much, and whether that decision will preserve the economic structure. This role is critical in maintaining a complex economy with
wage and salary earners, international markets, multi-billion dollar
economic actors, and stock and bond markets. The state's role in
the economy is the subject of considerable disagreement, but to the
extent that it does have such a role, welfare economists ask:
(1) whether tax revenues and expenditures improve the mix of goods
1 65
and services produced in the economy (the allocation question);
(2) how this change benefits and harms particular groups (the distribution question); 166 and (3) what effect this has on the stability
of the economy, including employment, interest rates, inflation, and
productivity (the stabilization question).1 67 From an economic perspective, current takings jurisprudence asks only the allocation and
distribution questions.1 68 Takings jurisprudence does not examine
the effect on stability in the economy of socializing a regulation
through the imposition of a compensation requirement.
In addition to its role in the overall economy, the American
state is unique in that its coercive power is limited in such a way
as to force it into an exchange with the private property owner
when its coercion goes too far.1 69 So, while the state is actively
involved in deciding how to allocate and distribute resources, and
stabilize the effects of economic activity, the state is also one of
the very actors vying for resources and engaging in economic
activity. The takings clause limits the kind of economic activity in
which the state may participate.

165. See RHOADS, supra note 12, at 61.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Courts would ask the allocation question if they analyzed whether socializing
a regulation would improve the mix of goods and services. Instead, courts ask a slightly
different question: whether socializing the regulation by requiring compensation spreads
public burdens that, in all fairness and justice, should not be borne by individuals. See
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
169. That is, when the mix of property rights created by regulation creates more
harm to the individual than benefit to everyone else. See Monongehela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). This, from the welfare economist's point of view,
would be a question of distribution.
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IV. How MARKETS WORK: MARKET LOGIC
A market is simply an organizational framework that espouses
rationalization of production, 170 alienability, 171 and exchange. 172 Markets rely on the existence of commodities that can be exchanged
for value, 173 and commodities exist only to the extent that they can
be produced comparatively inexpensively from raw materials. 174
Something is a commodity by virtue of its alienability. 175 Thus,
if something cannot be alienated, then it .cannot be in the market
or enter the stream of commerce. 176 Under this model, land is
valuable by virtue of its capacity to produce alienable commodities
177
for exchange.
It is not a large conceptual step to make from viewing land as
something that produces commodities 17 to viewing land as a commodity itself.179 If land itself is alienable then it can enter the
stream of commerce and become part of the market.
Consumption of commodities, including land, is necessary for
markets to survive, flourish, and proliferate. Commodity consump-

170. See Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy
(1857-58) in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 221, 278-83 (Robert C. Tucker, ed., 2d ed.
1978); 1 SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 25, at 4-8.
171. See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE HOLY FAMILY: A CRITIQUE OF
CRITICAL CRITICISM (1845), reprinted in part in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 133 (Robert
C. Tucker, ed., 2d ed. 1978); 1 SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 25, at 41-56.
172. See Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy
(1857-58), in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 221, 234-35 (Robert C. Tucker, ed., 2d ed.
1978); 1 SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 25, at 19-25.
173. See Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy
(1857-58), in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 221, 235-36 (Robert C. Tucker, ed., 2d ed.
1978) (stating "[F]inalty, the needs of consumption determine production"); 1 SMITH,
WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 25, at 12-15. But see RHOADS, supra note 12, at 148-58
(describing producer-generated demand).
174. Cf. RHOADS, supra note 12, at 65-66 (describing downward pressure on price
of commodities due to competition in markets).
175.
[A]rticles of utility become commodities, only because they are products of
labour of private individuals or groups of individuals who carry on their work
independently of each other ....
[Tihe labour of the individual asserts itself
as a part of the labour of society, only by means of the relations which the
act of exchange establishes.
1 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL (1867), reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 294, 321
(Robert C. Tucker, ed., 2d ed. 1978)
176. See id.
177. See id.; HORWITZ I, supra note 16, at 32-34.
178. See infra note 188.
179. See HORWITZ II, supra note 21, at 33-37.
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tion is determined by each commodity's utility, which is ultimately
defined by consumer preference or willingness to pay. 180 "Good"
commodities are those for which continued demand matches supply and for which there is sufficient threshold demand to spur
investment in mass production, whether the commodities in question are antibiotics or toxic chemicals. "Bad" commodities are
those for which there is insufficient demand to justify production,
whether the commodity in question is a poor movie or an orphan
drug. 81 On its own, the market cannot distinguish between a "good"
commodity and a "bad" commodity beyond these definitions; only
informal norms and formal laws determine whether "good" com82
modities are produced or "bad" commodities are outlawed.
The utilitarian calculus embodied in the market is only as

principled or corrupt as those who transact in

it.183

Within the

constitutional framework, this distinguishing role can be played by
the state: in the legislature as the conduit for values codified through
the republican democratic process; in the courts as arbiters of the
meaning of those codified values and as protectors of minority
values and views; and in the executive branch in implementing and
executing those codified and interpreted values.

180. One of the fundamental critiques of utility is that there is no external control
on what is produced except demand. The concept of utility in a pure market system has
no right or wrong about it. "Fulfilling people's environmental, aesthetic, educational, or
charitable desires is an economic benefit just as much as is a new car." RHOADS, supra
note 12, at 62. John Kenneth Galbraith described the role of economics in measuring utility
as follows: "The consumer wants more. [The economist's] not to reason why, theirs but
to satisfy." John K. Galbraith, Economics as a System of Belief, in ECONOMICS, PEACE
AND LAUGHTER 82 (1971).
181. This involves another concept: marginalism. Total utility assesses which commodities we would rather do without altogether. Marginal utility evaluates the desire for
one additional unit of a given commodity. Take the example of water and diamonds.
Comparing total utility tells us that, if presented with an absolute choice between water
and diamonds, we would rather do without diamonds altogether. The total utility of water
is much higher than that of diamonds. However, if we already have enough water to satisfy
our survival needs, then having another diamond will be much more satisfying then having
another bucket of water. That is, the marginal utility of diamonds is higher than the
marginal utility of water. See RHOADS, supra note 12, at 25-26 (drawing on Adam Smith,
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (ed. 1910 rpt. 1964)
182. See Frank J. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of Just Compehsation Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1176 (1967)
[hereinafter Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness]. Professor Michelman uses the
term "ethical rightness" to distinguish the efficiency calculus from the limitations imposed
by informal norms or formal laws.
183. See id.
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V. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE STATE USES MARKET LOGIC

When the state permits market logic to drive its interpretation
of the proper definition of property, this eventually results in both
a lack of protection of private property and an undercutting of the
market system itself. It is important to understand the market in
its natural environment before critiquing its use in property law.
This section presents a view of market logic in the economy; it
then turns to a discussion of the application of those same principles to legal relationships, particularly private property. This will
set the stage to discuss how market principles, applied to the law
of takings, fundamentally alter the role of the state in regulating
private property.

A. The Problems Inherent in the Rationalizationof Property
Rights
Takings jurisprudence requires the state to become an economic actor by buying property that is subject to unduly heavy
regulation. This mandate resolves the problem of state invasion
into the realm of private property. However, the use of market logic
to determine the nature and extent of the property interest being
regulated is problematic: how does the state judge which regulations are appropriate? Markets are driven by a creative rationalization that constantly seeks greater efficiency and new commodities. 8 4 However, at some point creative rationalization becomes
incompatible with responsible state action. The creative rationalization of the market becomes the "random splintering" of state
action, and is driven too much by the market in defining and
85
recognizing property rights.
184. Creative rationalization is the positive impetus provided by markets for innovation in commodities and production. Creative rationalization permits new idea development and new, more efficient ways of producing commodities for the marketplace. Creative
rationalization provides the fundamental spark for invention and production, but it is also
responsive to marketplace demand.

185. Random splintering is creative rationalization operating outside the market and
in spheres where it should not be the primary force. Random splintering is "a right thing
in the wrong place" as Justice Sutherland pointed out in a different context in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); namely, the market's natural urge
to commodify, reduce to economically efficient units, and satisfy self-interest.
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Land has traditionally been viewed as "property 18 6 (although
not all "property" is land).18 7 Land was at one time a producer of
commodities (feudal rents) and then, upon rejection of the feudal
tenure system (in which the fee belonged absolutely to the sovereign), became a commodity itself. Thus, it is not a conceptual
stretch to view the rights that inhere in the land as capable of
rationalization (i.e., amenable to being reduced to economically
more efficient units). For example, land is commonly thought to
be comprised of three (or four) estates: surface, subsurface, air
rights, and (where recognized) support. Future interests such as life
estates and fee tails are another traditional way of splintering land
interests. This rationalization of land already appears to be taking
place, particularly wherever American cultural, social, and economic institutions all presume some quantum of exchange as part
of their fabric.188
In an increasing number of institutions outside the economy,
the market and the logic of economically efficient reduction already inform decision-making. If something can be exchanged for
value, it is part of the market; 189 those who have organized their
thinking to integrate this exchangeability calculuis into their decisions have appealed to market logic.1 90 From this perspective, a
pre-nuptial agreement is a "rationalization" of the marital relationship: the actors take one slice of that relationship, the financial
relationship of the parties based on their pre-marital positions, and
separate it from the whole relationship. They rationalize this part
of the relationship and place an exchange value on it. Quite apart
from its fairness' 91 or rightness,1 92 the practice is a marketization
186. See HoRwITz II, supra note 21, at 145-48.

187. Intellectual "property" is a common example of non-landed property. See, e.g.,
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (recognizing trade secret as property).
188. A recent example of rationalization is property interests being found in secrecy.

See id. at 1103-04 (holding that "to the extent Monsanto has an interest in its health,
safety and environmental data cognizable as a trade secret property right under Missouri

law, that property right was protected by the taking clause of the fifth amendment [sic)").
189. See RHOADS, supra note 12, at 64-66.

190. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977).
191. See Laura P. Graham, The Uniform PremaritalAgreement Act and Modern Social
Policy, 28 WAKE FOREST L. Rv.1037 (1993) (advocating greater latitude in contracting
rights and responsibilities in pre-marital agreements); but see Gail F. Brod, Premarital
Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229 (1994) (arguing pre-marital

agreements legalize gender discrimination and disguise it as freedom of contract).
192. See Graham, supra note 191.
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and rationalization of the marital relationship. Market logic constantly presses for further rationalization so that commodification
may take place. 193

This "rationalization" is appropriate in the economic context.
Indeed, the rationalization of resources and their conversion into
commodities produces incentives for creativity in the market.

94

However, such rationalization of resources becomes problematic
when it is misapplied and extended into a sphere of human endeavor where it does not belong. This creative rationalization in
the definition of constitutionally protectable property interests causes
"random splintering."
Random splintering is the by-product of market logic applied
to social institutions. However, market logic does not have univer-

sal applicability in takings jurisprudence because it is not the only
theory through which "property" can be analyzed. Because alternative property theories do exist, market logic alone cannot com95
pletely define a non-compensable regulation.
Where the state's interest and the owner's loss are both rele-

vant, the decision as to whether a regulation has gone "too far" has
become a battle over the definition of the property interest that is
193. Examples of this type of fragmentation are plentiful. The Mobile Cotton Bowl
is a marketization of the sporting tradition: by redefining the tradition as something that
has exchange value as a commodity, the logic of markets has co-opted the tradition. See
Richard Sandomir, Advertising: Companies Pursue Electronic Ways to Insure That Sports
Advertisers Get the Best Sites in the House, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 14, 1995, at D7 (observing
that even corner of television picture can be sold to market actor for single game, for
single region); see Stuart Elliott, Advertising: Why Promote Cereal With Ice Cream
Giveaways and Why Do Coke Ads Ape Pepsi's 'Congo' Commercials?, N.Y TIMEs, Sept.
5, 1995, at D5 ("Now that Cadbury Schweppes has become the first corporate sponsor of
an individual college football game, by signing an agreement to promote the next three
Texas-Oklahoma matchups on behalf of Dr [sic] Pepper, how long will it take for other
schools to sell off rights to games quarter by quarter?").
194. See 1 SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 25, at 11.
195. This is the case even allowing for categorical takings, a reference to an
identifiable group of cases in which a taking may be found regardless of the state interest
involved. The two categories currently recognized are "physical invasions," Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1981), and "loss of all economic
viability", Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The "physical
invasion" test is easier to apply because the fact-finder can see whether the state has
physically invaded the property. But see Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 1600 (1987) [hereinafter Michelman, Takings] (arguing that Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission was analytically consistent with physical invasion test because owner
was made to suffer invasion by public upon granting lateral access easement as condition
to building larger house on beach). The loss of all economic viability is much more
problematic because its proof requires that the aggrieved owner and the courts engage in
exactly the kind of economic splintering that is the subject of this Article.
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the subject of the regulation: should the court adopt the state's or
the owner's definition of the property interest? This battle encourages the state actor to define the property interest as broadly as
possible so that the "denominator" 196 will be large enough to withstand the reduction caused by the regulation without going "too
far." Owners, on the other hand, will be encouraged to present their
property interests as being perfectly coterminous with the nature
and extent of the restriction imposed.
In other words, if the owner can convince the adjudicating
body that the nature of the specific loss occasioned by the disputed
restriction is a separate, recognizable property interest, then the
court could find that the restriction causes a compensable taking
because the extent of loss of that "property interest" will always
be close to 100%.197 Rationalization allows a court to view a restricted aspect of property as a separate property interest.
These definitions of property interests come from the logic of
markets, which encourages creative splintering of resources aided
by the technology of rational production. However, in the context
of regulatory takings, the "technology" is only as expansive as the
thought required to splinter the interest. Here, the creativity is as
innovative (and, therefore, as random) as the owner's conception
of the loss occasioned by the restriction. If an owner can convince
the adjudicating body that the interest should be recognized (and
therefore protected), the regulation will amount to a taking and the
state will be required to pay compensation or invalidate the law.
When the state, whose primary roles are in providing security
of property and orderly relationships among citizens, 98 engages in
the creative rationalization of the market, its priorities and the state
itself are no longer integral to the definition of "security" of property.199 Protectable property interests then come to find their legitimacy not in the state but in the market. The state's encounter with
196. The "denominator" is the size of the property interest affected. See D. Benjamin

Barros, Defining "Property" in the Just Compensation Clause, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853

(1995) (discussing denominator problem in determining measure against which regulation

should be tested); Oswald, supra note 93, at 102 (same).

197. This will be the case unless nuisance law or background principles of State

law counsel otherwise. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1029-32 & n.18 (1992).
198. See supra part III.A-B.
199. Professor Lowi warns that "society must become capable of controlling,
suppressing and absorbing market forces or the market becomes menace rather than good
provider." Lowi, END OF LIBERALISM, supra note 38, at 7. See also Theodore J. Lowi,
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conflicts over property rights that it did not create and its arbitration of disputes in which it has a smaller stake may cause it to lose
legitimacy as an actor.
For example, in Kaiser Aetna, a property owner wanted to
dredge a non-navigable pond, create an access channel to the Hawaiian Bay, and sell homes along the pond with the promise that
the pond and the channel would be open only to owners of homes
on the pond. 200 A 3000 square-foot home on a frontage lot 80 feet
wide sold for $250,000; without the public access exclusion, the
same home sold for $50,000, an 80% reduction in the value of the
whole parcel. 201 Unless the Supreme Court either announced a clear
proportion rule (e.g., a 75% loss) that precisely defined a compensable taking or overruled the case that refused to recognize a 75%
reduction in value, 202 the proposed 80% loss should not have resulted in a taking.
20 3
Yet the Court held the regulation did result in a taking.
Kaiser Aetna convinced the Court that the property interest involved was the interest in excluding the public from access to the
pond and ocean channel. 204 The right to exclude ("universally held
to be a fundamental element of the property right"), 20 5 was worth
Deconstructing American Law, 63 Ttx. L. REv. 1591 (1985) (reviewing BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984)).

200. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
201. This would be almost exactly the same reduction suffered by Mr. Mugler, see
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (brewers), and less than the loss suffered by Mr.
Goldblatt, see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (gravel excavation).
202. See Mugler, 123 U.S. at 675.
203. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
204. The corporate interest in exclusion is not of the same nature as the private
interest in exclusion, the Court's implied conclusion to the contrary. Particularly in this
case, the interest in exclusion was clearly the interest in exclusivity (rather than in security
and autonomy, the more traditional values protected by the exclusive right):
To view the issue [of individual property ownership] simply as one of public/private entanglement is to overlook a mistaken assumption: attributing to business
corporations the qualities, rights and protections acknowledged for private individuals. Such a naively unquestioned transfer ignores the undeniable community function of corporations and fails to hold them accountable as community
institutions. The mistake is for our conventional thinking and language to
award to such large and powerful institutions, integral to community life, the
same rights to privacy and unaccountability as protect the lone person. Policies
that wilfully ignore the inherent distinctions between corporations and individual persons are egregiously mistaken, because the property distribution, and
hence the power balance, between the two are egregiously unequal.
Krueckeberg, supra note 151, at 306.
205. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
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$200,000-precisely the loss in value that would have been caused
by making the private pond public. Kaiser Aetna's definition of the
property interest was clearly generated by its understanding of how
much it stood to lose financially if the navigational servitude were
imposed. Kaiser Aetna separated the constraint (the navigational
servitude) and the loss occasioned by the constraint (the loss in
property value) and redefined it as a property interest requiring
constitutional protection. The ultimate source of its definition was
the market: as a developer what it stood to gain or lose in the sale
of a commodity (country-club-like exclusivity).
The state's expertise is in protecting security and ordering
relationships among citizens. Because the market economy is at its
best when it creates commodities for exchange in pursuit of selfinterest, when the state acts like the market, it sacrifices its authority and power to protect security and order societal relationships.
Thus the state relinquishes control over definitions of property that
would enable it to protect the general welfare. Whereas the market
is a sphere of the self, the state is a sphere of the collective. While
these spheres are not mutually exclusive, state action that is primarily self-interested contradicts its collective character. The state's
participation in the market-creating commodities for exchange in
the pursuit of self-interest-removes it from the realm of collective
action and immerses it in, rather than distances it from, the market.
Without enough distance from the market, the state cannot accurately judge whether privately created property "rights" are collectively tenable.
The state must protect the interests found to be property regardless of whether or not it defines the debate over what constitutes property. If it must protect those interests only as recognized
by market definitions of property, then private property cannot
survive except by the market definition. As a result, the state has
no real role in evaluating whether an interest should be recognized
as protectable property.
If the state may not control the definition of protectable property, because it has deferred to a property defined in the first
instance by market logic and values, then its stake in protecting
those rights is necessarily reduced by the quantum of deference
accorded the market. If self-interest becomes the arbiter of what is
a protectable property right, without reference to the collective or
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public interest, the state has no qualitative way to differentiate
among competing self-interests.
When the state loses the ability to differentiate among
competing self-interests (one of which may be its own), it
faces difficulty in fashioning remedies that will protect the
market and self-interested action at the same time. Why, for
example, would the state punish the action of a private property
owner who taps into a state-owned sewer or water line, or
(even more amorphously) into a cable television line? On the
one hand, the private property owner is exercising a liberty
interest in digging into her own ground and connecting and benefiting
from these commodities. The owner is maximizing benefit,
minimizing cost and creatively rationalizing the water, sewer,
and cable television commodities. On the other hand, the
state entity has a liberty interest in using its property as a
profit-producing service for the provision of water or the removal of sewage; it may secure financial benefit from protecting the monopoly of the cable company that provides television
services. The state wants to maximize benefit of profits from
water sales and sewage removal; the cable company wants to
maximize profit from the sale of access to television programming.
Without a non-market judgment of the relative property
rights of the actors, there is no way to differentiate qualitatively between their desires. To the extent that there is sentiment that the state and cable company should receive a remedy
for the acts of the property owner, some other understanding of
the quality of their property interests is at play. The market
logic, which recognizes creative rationalization in the pursuit
of maximization of utility, is an insufficient measure of the
interests at stake. If creative rationalization of the landowners'
property rights requires protection of her right to dig into her
own ground and tap into public services, market logic alone
would undermine the desirable effects of having water, sewer,
and cable television services by reducing incentives to undertake the financial risk of such enterprises. Indeed, it is the other,
non-market logic-a logic of interdependence, stability, and security that derives from the basic structure of property-that
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ultimately protects private property 2 6 and the market economy that

relies on

it.207

B. Market-Based Creative RationalizationDistinguishedfrom
Conceptual Severance
The concern over the apparent trend in takings law to redefine
the interests at stake is by no means new. Professor Margaret Jane
Radin has developed a framework for analyzing takings problems
that is concerned with, among other things, "conceptual severance":
It consists of delineating a property interest consisting of just
what the government action has removed from the owner, and
then asserting20 that that particular whole thing has been permanently taken. 1
Every curtailment of any of the liberal indicia of property, every
regulation of any portion of an owner's "bundle of sticks," is a
whole of that particular portion considered sepataking20of
9 the
rately.
Thus, this strategy hypothetically or conceptually "severs" from
the whole bundle of rights just those strands that are interfered
with by the regulation, and then hypothetically or conceptually
those strands in the aggregate as a separate whole
construes
210
thing.
Market logic applied to property results in severing something
from the bundle of rights. It is certainly compatible with the framework of conceptual severance. However, the critique of market'
logic is not a counterpoint to a political philosophy, as is conceptual severance, which provides a clear critique of classic liberal
206. It has been suggested that modem democracy would not be possible without
a market economy. If that is true, then private property rightly understood is crucial to the

survival of democratic institutions. Ironically, the undermining of private property by
market logic may jeopardize the market, as well as democratic institutions.
207. See 1 WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 156. "[The modem economic

order under modem conditions could not continue if its control of resources were not
upheld by the legal compulsion of the state; that is, if its formally 'legal' rights were not

upheld by the threat of force:' Id. at 65.
208. Radin, Liberal Conception of Property, supra note 117, at 1676.

209. Id. at 1678.
210. Id. at 1676.
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conceptions of property.21' Market logic derives from the economy:
from maximization of self-interest, commodification, consumption,
and rationalization of production. While conceptual severance exposes the limits of a philosophical tradition whose raison d'etre is
to explain political behavior, market logic creates a different framework altogether, one devoid of accommodation for political acts.
Professor Radin further implies that the severed strands that
liberal thought would compensate are, in fact, property interests. 212
Market logic, however, is not so principled. Market logic is driven
by commodification, consumption, rationalization, and maximization of self-interest. Conceptual severance defines the interest at
stake in KaiserAetna as public access to Kuapa Pond,2 3 or the loss
of the right to exclude, or even the sufferance of a physical invasion: "boats of strangers physically entered the Kaiser Aetna Corporation's water."214 These fit neatly into the traditional categories
of property interests: exclusion or physical invasion.
Market logic invents a new kind of property interest, a strand
that had not been an independent strand in the bundle: the creation
of a right to reap profit from exclusion. Market logic is the force
by which property interests come to be protectable when the state
imposes regulations that interfere with owners' desires. Its effect
is more insidious and disruptive than conceptual severance allows.
Conceptual severance certainly occurs when market logic defines
and creates property interests; but the severing concept is not the
classical liberal ideology of Radin's framework. The severing concept is commodification, reduction to economically efficient units,
and satisfaction of self-interest.
The conceptual severance model also needs the liberal conception of property to critique the model's reliance on rigid, self-evident rules: the overapplication of the "Rule of Law."215 Market
logic departs from this critique because there are no rigid, self-evident underlying rules by which the market defines property inter211. See id. at 1676-78.
212. Professor Radin characterizes the interest taken in Loretto, for example, as "an
easement to run a cable," id. at 1678, and in Kaiser Aetna, as an "easement or servitude,"

id. at 1678.
213, "IT]he interest taken by the government's action in Kaiser Aetna is likewise
most readily characterizable as an easement or servitude." Radin, Liberal Conception of
Property,supra note 117, at 1678.

214. Id. at 1678.
215. See id. at 1684.
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ests. By definition, market logic thrives on change; thus, the liberal
conception of property that is the object of critique in Radin's
discussion of conceptualism is, if anything, too stable for market
logic. Market logic applied to property is more problematic precisely because the object of critique is like a moving target. While
the model of conceptualism is powerful, it cannot explain the emergence of "property" interests like the one in Kaiser Aetna.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT's ROLE IN CONSTITUTIONALIZING
MARKET LOGIC
The Supreme Court, however, appears to believe that there is
nothing wrong with accepting the definitions of private property
generated by a market that creates property out of losses occasioned by regulation. Over the years, the Court has developed a
series of tests to determine whether or not a taking has occurred.
As shown below, these tests reflect an inappropriate deference to
market logic and thus are ineffective mechanisms for defining the
sort of concrete property rights necessary to an efficient protection
of both property rights and state police power.
A. An Overview of the Tests Used in Takings Doctrine
Takings jurisprudence, though unclear, has afforded some touchstones over the course of its historical development from which
courts have worked to implement core constitutional values. These
touchstones are usually theories that focus on either the government's or the property owner's interest, and then balance one against
the other.
1. Nuisance
The original source of action and relief for an aggrieved property owner, once courts decided that state action could deprive an
owner of rights without formally condemning the property, 2 6 has
its roots in the tort doctrine of nuisance.217 Even if the regulation
216. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 172 (1871).
217. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1887).
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deprived the owner of some or all of the benefit of the property,
218
he was not entitled to relief if the regulated use was noxious.
The weakness of this doctrine as a theoretical framework for constitutional decisions inheres in its narrowness. Although the doctrine later took account of "innocent" competing uses by property
owners that deprived neighboring owners of the beneficial use of
their property,

19

it never incorporated more attenuated state de-

struction of private property.220 The Supreme Court has rejected
2
nuisance doctrine as defining the scope of the takings issue. 21
2. Physical Invasion

The "physical invasion" test developed concurrently with the
nuisance theory of takings. 222 It expands the protection of private
property by requiring compensation when there is an actual physical invasion of property that deprives the owner of some beneficial
use. 223 In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,224 the

Supreme Court reaffirmed the physical invasion test and identified
the test's two unexamined assumptions. First, the test is rooted in
the most traditional conception of property, for it is definitionally
limited to physical personalty and realty.225 Second, the doctrine
can be so formalistically applied as to make it almost absurd; for
example, Loretto involved the physical invasion of only one and
one-half cubic feet of an unused rooftop of an apartment build218. See id. at 668-69.
219. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915).
220. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
221. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Note,
Developments in the Law: Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1466-67 (1978). See also Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992). But see Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (reviewing public nuisance
doctrine and holding that no taking occurred based on doctrine of investment-backed
expectations).
222. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 180-81 (1871)
(finding taking where plaintiff's land was "actually invaded by superinduced additions of
water, earth, sand, or other material" resulting from construction of public dam; noting
contrary authority that there is no redress for consequential injuries to property arising
from improvements to public infrastructure).
223. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987) (finding
easement dedication requirement constituted physical invasion).
224. 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (finding taking where petitioner was forced to allow
respondent to place 4" x 4" x 4" cable box on roof of his apartment building).
225. "[W]hat troubles me most about today's decision is that it represents an archaic
judicial response to a modem social problem." Id. at 455 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ing. 226 The physical invasion test, like regulation of noxious uses,

tends to focus on the government entity involved, and to be justifiable
in only the most obvious cases of governmental invasion of property. The physical invasion doctrine is useful only in a very small
range of disputes, because it seems to lose its principled force as
the magnitude of the invasion decreases. 227 Further, as a categorical

physical invasion sheds little light on the most
takings doctrine,
228
difficult cases.

3. Diminution in Value

"Diminution in value" was historically the most important
source of analysis for takings jurisprudence. While the noxious use
and physical invasion tests focus on the nature of government
action, the primary focus of the diminution in value test is the

economic injury to the individual.229 This test seeks to protect a
private property owner's economic interest from threat by state
regulation.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 30 provides the standard for

this test, balancing the decrease in the value of the property and
226. Id. at 422. See also id. at 450 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Literally read, the
Court's test opens the door to endless metaphysical struggles over whether or not an
individual's property has been 'physically' touched:'); William K. Jones, Confiscation:A
Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 18 (1995) (characterizing loss as
"trivial").
227. The physical invasion doctrine may be limited because the standard was
developed at a time when a taking was found based on the kind of activity involved in the
dispute, rather than the extent, or degree, of governmental interference with private
property ownership. Once the analysis changed from the former to the latter, physical
invasions had to be measured by the degree of their invasiveness. Yet the standard is a per
se standard: if physical invasion, then taking. The reason Loretto seems to be a trivial
decision in some respects stems less from its principled nature (small even for a
constitutional deprivation), than from a mode of analysis that has not weathered well the
journey from the 19th to the 20th century.
228. There has been some confluence of thought lately on the physical invasion test.
Several commentators have argued that recent Supreme Court cases are explicable if
subsumed under this test. E.g., Michelman, Takings, supra note 195, at 1611-12. For
example, the Nollans were really just being subjected to an "invasion" when their easement
dedication was found to be a compensable taking. Id. at 1608-09. Commentators are no
less inclined to be won over by a doctrinal framework that seems easy to apply.
229. This implicates the controversy over the presumption of validity in modern
takings cases: the state or the individual. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994) (holding conditions City placed upon building permit effected taking; finding City
bore burden not to show "essential nexus" between legitimate state interest and permit
conditions, and also to show that permit conditions were "roughly proportional" to impact
of proposed development).
230. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See supra text accompanying notes 111-125.
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the importance of the regulation. The majority and dissenting opinions in Mahon focus on different values to be taken into consid-

eration, such as the loss of value to the property owner in comparison to the entire value of the enterprise, as opposed to the value

of the loss in and of itself. But when the majority states that a
government regulation that goes "too far" will constitute a taking,
it establishes the private economic interest as the measure of the

regulation and relegates the nature of the governmental interest to
a position of secondary importance. 21 This balancing test has affected all subsequent takings court decisions, for the ad hoc nature
of the balance to be struck fails to provide enduring standards upon
which courts may rely and ultimately leaves most of the decisionmaking power in the Supreme Court. 2 2 Its explicit use is on the
wane,23 3 although it turns up from time to time as a supportive
2 34

doctrine.

231. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
232. This is evidenced by the lack of agreement on what diminution represents.
Whether diminution refers to an owner's entire wealth, or the operation in question, or
even some sub-operation to which the regulation applies, is not clear. The "bundle of
rights" that make up private property ownership does not always provide guidance as to
which rights in the bundle are of sufficient importance so as to constitute a taking should
their exercise be abridged. If the state deprives an owner of his right to exclude others, it
may not be a taking according to PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-83
(1980), or it may effectively destroy a substantial investment, Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1979). Reminiscent of the "estates" of Mahon, 260 U.S. at
414, the right to build in superjacent airspace may be worthless by virtue of the
codification in zoning of a convention favoring two-story homes in a residential area, and
yet may be the focus of intense litigation in a densely populated downtown urban area, as
in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 105 (1978).
233. The balancing test articulated in Mahon has generated other balancing tests,
perhaps the most well-known of which is Professor Michelman's test of utility and
fairness, first articulated in an article by the same name. See Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness, supra note 182. Professor Michelman would balance overall social utility
(comprised of demoralization costs, or the price required to restore the morale of the owner
being regulated), and settlement costs (closing costs, insurance, relocation, etc.) against
basic fairness concerns. Id. at 1193-96. Basic fairness concerns come into play when the
social utility equation does not work, as when the long-term effects of the regulation cause
a greater loss than the present demoralization costs can reflect. Although the test offers an
attractive rationale, the rationale itself is suspect. Social utility can be extremely difficult
to quantify, as can fairness, and both then become subject to manipulation by legislatures,
litigants, and courts. Just as the tax law has become part of the economic calculus for
individual and corporate income production, so too could such a test of utility and fairness
become a part of the calculus in land-use decisions, thereby nullifying some of its positive
effect.
234. E.g., Concrete Pipe and Products of California v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602 (1993); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1066 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 330-35 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496 (1987).
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4. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
The reasonable investment-backed expectation is another test
of what constitutes a taking, and is most clearly discussed in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,2 5 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 236 and PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins. 3 7 Monsanto involved two statutes, one
passed in 1969, the other in 1978, which required developers of
pesticides to submit their formulae to the EPA. 238 The statute authorized the EPA to disclose some of the information publicly, although
doing so might constitute publicizing a trade secret. 2 9 The 1969
law was amended in 1972 to allow developers like Monsanto to
designate their formulae as trade secrets and receive protection for
them. 240 The 1978 statute returned the process to pre-1972 status,
with changes not relevant here. The Supreme Court held that for
the periods 1969-1972 and after 1978, the statutes notified Monsanto that its formulae were subject to disclosure, thus preventing
Monsanto from developing a reasonable investment-backed expectation. 241 However, the law from 1972 to 1978 notified Monsanto
of the protection of its trade secrets, and the Court found a taking
for frustration of Monsanto's reasonable investment-backed expec2 42
tation.
KaiserAetna involved a takings challenge that arose when the
Army Corps of Engineers attempted to subject Kuapa Pond, a
shallow pond then affected by oceanic tides but formerly separated
from the bay by a barrier reef, to the federal government's navigational servitude. A private builder had bought the pond and surrounding area to build a residential development. He dredged the
pond and dug out the barrier reef, which provided boat owners
access to the bay. The builder had attempted to procure a permit
to dredge the pond, but the Corps of Engineers told him none was
necessary.2 43 The Supreme Court held that, given Kaiser Aetna's
reliance on that assurance, it had no notice that its marina might
235. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
236. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
237. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
238. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 991.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 992-93.
Id.
Id. at 1006, 1009.
Id. at 1010-16.
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 167 (1979).
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be subject to the navigational servitude. Therefore, the marina
could not be taken without just compensation because the imposition of a servitude interfered with Kaiser Aetna's reasonable invest244
ment-backed expectation.
Finally, PruneYard 45 involved a takings challenge by a shopping mall owner following the California Supreme Court's holding
that the State's constitutional provision of free speech and assembly did not interfere with the mall owner's property rights.24 6 In
this case, some high school students were soliciting signatures for
a petition opposing a United Nations resolution. After mall security
asked them to leave, they sued to enjoin the shopping center from
infringing on their free speech rights under the California Constitution. 247 The United States Supreme Court held that the shopping
center's right to exclude others was not so essential that reasonable
restrictions of that right in furtherance of the State's interest in
48
protecting free speech would constitute a taking for public use.2
In each of the three preceding cases there was a dispute over
one of the "sticks" in the "bundle" of rights that comprises private
property: the trade secret in Monsanto;249 the exclusivity of the
dredged marina in KaiserAetna;250 and the right to exclude political activists in PruneYard.25' The owners spent considerable sums
of money in developing their property. A taking occurred when the
governmental action disrupted the status quo regarding the expectation that the developer had relied upon making the original in252
vestment decision.
There appears to be a further showing necessary, namely that
the property owner be deprived of notice of the governmental inter244. See id. at 179 ("While the consent of individual officials representing the
United States cannot 'estop' the United States, it can lead to the fruition of a number of

expectancies embodied in the concept of 'property'-expectancies that, if sufficiently
important, the Government must condemn and pay for....") (citations omitted).
245.
246.
74 (1980).
247.
248.
249.

PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S.
PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 77.
Id. at 83-84.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984).

250. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
251. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84.
252. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984); PruneYard Shopping Ctr.
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). All
the owners hoped to receive a fair return as a result of the disputed property right

maintaining its prior status: undisclosed, consumption-oriented, and private, respectively.
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est.253 The owner in Kaiser Aetna was not on notice, and the Court
found there to be a taking. Kaiser Aetna relied on the Army Corps
of Engineers' assurances that it needed no permit to dredge the
pond, a permit it would have needed had the access channel been
subject to a navigational servitude. This reliance was enhanced by
an eleven-year period during which the Corps acquiesced to Kaiser
Aetna's activity. Certainly, this behavior created the impression
that the government would not require Kaiser Aetna to relinquish
that reliance interest, thus failing to put Kaiser Aetna on notice 25of4
any interest the government might have had in the property.
Hence, Kaiser Aetna could justifiably argue that the right to exclude non-member boat owners from its marina was one of the
property rights it had intended to buy when it decided to build a
that the government
residential area and dredge the marina, and
2 55
contrary.
the
to
indication
no
provided
had
In contrast, the owners in Monsanto and PruneYard were on
notice, and the Court did not find a taking. The Court found that
Monsanto had notice of the governmental interest in the content of
the pesticide formulae being developed. Although Monsanto had
an investment-backed expectation of maintaining its trade secrets,
that expectation was not reasonable, at least in part because it was
on notice of the disclosure requirement.25 6 Similarly, one could
argue that the owner of the PruneYard Shopping Center should
reasonably have been on notice that the area would attract more
than commercial activity.25 7 The very nature of the shopping mall
implies that it is more public than a single retail store, although
not as public as a street comer. Therefore, PruneYard should have
been on notice that the right to exclude others was more limited
in a privately owned public place than it would be on other private
land.

253. See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1006.
254. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179.
255. Id. at 179-80.
256. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1006.

257. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 89-90 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring). In affirming the California Supreme Court's decision, which rejected the
takings claim on the basis of a more expansive expressive right protected by the California

Constitution, the Court refused to extend the holding of Lloyd v. Tanner Corp., 407 U.S.
551 (1972) (permitting exclusion of expressive activity on private property). See
PruneYard,447 U.S. at 81.
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Thus, the reasonable investment-backed expectation is a private property interest that carries legitimacy because it is an economic interest, supported by consideration, which maintains an
existence over time. The limitation of such a standard in takings
cases should be clear, for property that contains no investment
cannot be protected by this definition. The reliance interest, although a possible factor in takings analysis, is not an appropriate
requirement for all takings cases, and is subject to circularity like
other takings tests.25 8 The Monsanto case also raises the possibility
that notice creates an end-run in the investment-backed expectation
because the Court both finds a taking where there was no notice
as to some of Monsanto's trade secrets, and finds no taking where
there was notice as to others.25 9 In other words, this analysis suggests that there might come a time when government action could
never result in a taking because as property becomes more highly
regulated, the standard for what is a reasonable investment-backed
expectation would become further out of reach. Although it indicates the values to be protected by the Just Compensation Clause
more clearly than other tests, reasonable investment-backed expectation is an incomplete doctrine that has had to be stretched or
supplemented by other legal doctrines in order to cover the areas
of private property in need of protection from unreasonable regulation.
5. Economic Viability
The standard of "economic viability 260 owes its derivation to
a seemingly innocuous footnote in the case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 261 The meaning of this standard
has never been fully explained by the Court. 262 Yet subsequent cases
258. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis,
of course; for if the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as
a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what courts say it
is.").
259. Perhaps if regulatory takings were purely a matter of due process, this case
would not be an aberration, since notice would be required as a matter of law.

260. The concept of "economic viability" is now widely utilized.
261. 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978).
262. Professor Oswald has recently provided an excellent analysis of the possible
meaning and, in the context of decisions using the framework, its misuse. Oswald, supra
note 93 (analyzing various cases decided by Supreme Court that use "economic viability"
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that use the phrase are the core structure around which takings
analysis is formed. Economic viability is the primary symptom of
the narrow market logic that the Court uses to analyze the takings
question to the detriment of fundamental constitutional values, including private property.263 This test will result in an unpredictable juris64
prudence at best.
The development of economic viability is inconsistent; a few

major cases and themes emerge.
a. Penn Central: An Innocuous Beginning
The modem era of takings jurisprudence starts with the 1978
Penn Central case. 265 Given the outcome of Penn Central, it is
or "economically beneficial use" and ultimately concluding that framework is flawed and
dictates inconsistent results). Economic viability next appears in a context that makes its
citation not only curious, but out of character, because of the summary fashion in which
it is used. Justice Powell, writing for p unanimous Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255 (1980), abrogated by First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1986), in a brief statement of a balance sought in takings
analysis, articulated the private interest as "economically viable." Id. at 260. The Court
cites Penn Central as though the phrase were so well-understood that it required no further
exegesis, and the Court goes on to provide none. "The application of a general zoning law
to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978)." Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. Agins involved landowners
in the city of Tiburon, California, who wished to construct a high-density residential area
on five prime acres overlooking San Francisco Bay. After they had acquired the land, but
before submitting any kind of design proposal to the city, California passed a law requiring
Tiburon to prepare a general plan for land use and open-space development. The city
modified the density requirements for the land in dispute, reducing the permissible density
to one to five single-family residences for the entire parcel. Thus, the Court cited the
relevant language of Penn Central as though it had been a holding and stated the
proposition as though its meaning was plain. Subsequent cases have indicated, however,
that Penn Central's language does not so clearly support this proposition. For example, in
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985), Justice White,
writing for a unanimous Court, increased the importance of economic viability by
describing it as "our general approach" However, he offers no explanation of the phrase
"economically viable" in this case either. Such was the introduction of "economic
viability" into Supreme Court case law in the area of takings.
263. See Oswald, supra note 93, at 131. The very fact of the prominence of these
tests is symptomatic of the pervasiveness of this new market jurisprudence. The reason
that these tests are doctrinally weak and lead to inconsistent results is not that they focus
too heavily on the property owner at the expense of the public good, but rather because
they rely on a jurisprudential framework whose defining characteristic is change, namely
the logic of markets.
264. See discussion infra part VI.C.2.
265. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In it the
Supreme Court upheld against a takings challenge a landmark preservation law that
allowed the city to deny a proposal to construct a 50-story office tower above Grand
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difficult to discern how much light the facts of the case shed upon
the concept of economic viability.266 Indeed, the Court provides no

direct illumination of the phrase in the case itself: in footnote 36
of Penn Central, Justice Brennan remarked that if Penn Central
could "demonstrate at some point in the future that circumstances
have so changed that the Terminal ceases to be 'economically
267
viable' [Penn Central] may obtain relief."
Penn Central indicates that the loss of the economic viability
of the air rights above the terminal is not the measure of the taking:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated. * * * [T]his
Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel
as a whole-here,
the city tax block designated as the "land268
mark site.

Neither does diminution in value alone constitute a taking; 269 therefore, "economic viability" cannot be equated simply with the loss
270
of property value.
Profitability, though not the only factor important to the determination of a taking, is a factor that matters, 271 and economic
viability demands a showing of the extent of monetary loss caused
Central Terminal in New York. Finding that the owners of the terminal could still plan on
a reasonable return to their investment and that the air rights into which the building was
to have been erected could be moved to other places, and noting the importance of
preserving the unique architecture, the Court found no taking. Id. at 136-38.
266. See supra note 265.
267. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36.
268. Id. at 130-31.
269. See id. at 131.
270. Economic viability may include in its calculus the burdens imposed by the
regulation. But Penn Central indicates that, at least in the area of historical landmark
preservation, the legislative judgment of who receives the benefits of the regulation is
presumed to be accurate. See id. at 134-35. If the complaining property owner is found
legislatively to be benefitted by the regulation as well as burdened by it, then the burden
in fact borne does not enter the judicial calculus of whether the property is still
economically viable. Nollan hints that the standard will be made a more rigorous one, see
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987), and Dolan still permits
a factual showing that the end is legitimate and the means roughly proportional to
achieving that purpose to prove a regulation non-compensable, see Dolan v. City of Tigard,
114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320-21 (1994).
271. Penn Central also failed to show that the Commission reviewing the building
petitions would deny permission to construct any building over the terminal. See Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978).
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by varying degrees of regulation.272 Since the air rights above the

terminal were transferable they had not been taken or diminished
in any way; they had only been moved. Property may therefore be

economically viable even though not all the property rights are
actually in the physical parcel being regulated, so long as they are
2 73
somewhere, and capable of being exploited.
b. Agins: Setting the Stage
Agins274 has clarified what economic viability is not rather than

shedding any light on a precise definition. The Supreme Court, more
275
certain of the correct outcome than the California Supreme Court,

unanimously held that when property was still- developable for the
intended purpose, it was still economically viable, and thus not confiscated. The case may be most useful as a solidification of the economic
viability of private property as a measure of the validity of the
regulation in question. If the Supreme Court articulated the stand-

ard of economic viability with no need to apply it in this casesince the economic impact of "mere enactment"2 76 of zoning laws

was not significant enough in the minds of fifteen Justices in the
combined Supreme Courts to find a taking-then the significance
of the case may be its institutionalization of the standard.
c. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining: Stallingfor Time
The case of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation

Association277 also provides little guidance. Since takings analysis
272. Cf. Oswald, supra note 93, at 105.
273. Cf. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137 (reasoning that air rights secured through
New York City's transferrable development-rights program mitigated limitations imposed
by landmark designation on plaintiff's exploitation of air rights over his property).
274. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), abrogated by First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1986). For the facts
of the Agins case, see supra note 262.
275. The Supreme Court of California split 6-1 on the validity of the police power
exercised by Tiburon. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d. 25 (1979). The Supreme Court voted
9-0 to affirm, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Thus, the zoning ordinance
passed in response to California state law requiring such municipal planning survived the
facial attack. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(a),(e) (West Supp. 1979); see CAL. Gov'T CODE

§ 65563 (West Supp. 1979) (requiring all cities and counties to prepare plans for preservation
of open space); see also Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance No. 123 N.S., 124 N.S. (June 28, 1973).
276. Agins, 447 U.S. at 259-60.
277. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). Hodel, also a facial attack, involved the 1977 Surface
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depends upon specific fact situations, a facial challenge to a statute
with no facts does not clarify the parameters of the economic
viability of a regulated activity.2 78 The Fifth Amendment challenge
was a facial one, so the inquiry for the Court was whether "'mere
enactment' of the Surface Mining Act [had] deprived appellees of
economically viable use of their property

27 9

d Keystone: The Voices of Splintering Get Louder

Similarly, the Pennsylvania Legislature's judgment that pillars
of coal had to be left in place to prevent subsurface subsidence was
found not to be a regulatory taking of the use right.280 Although the
Supreme Court decided the Keystone case largely on the theory of
the physical non-severability of the affected parcels, 281 the Court
found the property as a whole to be economically viable. Therefore, the regulation was found to be a proper exercise of the police
power. As in Penn Central, the Court looked at the entire bundle
of rights in the parcel (indeed, in Penn Central, the Court factored
in the economic impact of the regulation when viewed with the
other parcels to which the air rights might be transferred) and not
at the individual sections of the parcel affected by the regulation.
Mining Act, which mandated regulation of surface mining of coal. See id. at 268-75
(summarizing 1977 Surface Mining Act whose provisions included prohibition of surface
mining operations where they will adversely affect publicly owned parks or places that
are included in National Register of Historic Sites.) The statute looks very much like the
Kohler Act, which was at issue in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-13
(1922), and the similar statute at issue in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
278. The Court hinted in a footnote, anticipating Williamson County Regional Plan.
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), that the allegedly useless variances
available for reclamation of certain kinds of coalfields-useless because both the letter
requirements of the Act and the variances mine owners were allowed to apply for were so
costly that they would neutralize the profit gained from mining in the first place-might
constitute a taking if there were evidence that a mine operator had not applied for a
variance because to use it would be too costly. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 297 n.39. This is
reminiscent of Justice Holmes' point in Mahon that the bundle of rights in a coalfield is
peculiarly thin, since the right to coal exists essentially in the right to mine it. Mahon,
260 U.S. at 414.
279. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 297.
280. Economic viability usually involves the "use" strand of one's bundle of
property rights, although there is no principle requiring this. A possible reason for this is
that the Industrial Revolution has expanded the variety and types of "use" that make land
economically viable.
281. The parcels became economically non-viable by virtue of the fact that the coal
that was there had to be left in place. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 496-97 (1987).
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In the context of Penn Central and Keystone, the economic
viability issue seems to have turned on the recognition of a profitable
status quo. When balanced against the city's interest in preserving
the station's historical architecture, and in the context of an enterprise that was, without exploitation of the contested air rights,
profitable, the Court declined to find a loss of all economic viability.
e. PruneYard: Commercial Use Meets Free Speech
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,2 2 the Court focused
on economic viability in the context of the entire shopping center
operation.2 13 The Court worked with a concept of economic viability that looks at the damage and attempts to sever it and recognize
it as a separate property right. However, even a loss of the right to
exclude, always considered one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of expectations called property, did not constitute a taking
because it was not essential to the economic value of the property.
Here the Court is exhibiting a tendency to conflate the traditional
property doctrine with its market counterpart. The right to decide
which non-owners may enter one's property is a fundamental right
given to the true owner of a piece of property. Yet the market
principle of property was not seriously offended since there was
no assault on rationalization, alienation, or exchangeability and
overall the interest was profitable, requiring access-or denying
exclusivity-was not offensive to the Constitution.
f Kaiser Aetna. A Strand Worth Severing
Contrast PruneYard with Kaiser Aetna v. United States,28 4 which
found a taking where the United States demanded that a privately
dredged marina and access canal to the Hawaiian Bay be opened
to the public under a federal navigational servitude.2 85 Here again
the Court cites the right to exclude others as the fundamental
property right being violated, 28 6 but the crucial difference is that
282. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).

283. Id. at 83 n.6.
284. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
285. Id.
286. See id. at 179-80.
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the exclusivity strand in this bundle of rights is the market commodity being threatened by diminution in value. It was the source
of the marina's economic viability. Clearly, a marina with exclusive
access to a bay connected to the Pacific ocean is an extraordinarily
valuable asset. 28 7 Unlike PruneYard, the Court did not even discuss
time, place, and manner regulations to minimize economic effect
because any reduction in the exclusive right would have compromised the income potential of the marina. The bundle of rights
concept often overlaps with the physicalist view of property, as in
Dolan v. City of Tigard, where the owner lost the exclusive use of
land near a neighboring creek by giving it to the city for flood
control. 288
g. Doctrinal Conclusions
Hodel makes it clear that fact-specificity is still a necessary
part of takings analysis, whether or not economic viability is the
standard.28 9 Agins reiterates that the challenged regulation must be
expressly applicable to the facts in dispute. 29 0 A loss of profit has
been a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of each takings
challenge since Mahon; the cases that use economic viability are
no different in that respect. Of course, the governmental interest
must be valid, and the appropriation must occur for some public
purpose. Economic viability changes none of these factors, which
have informed Supreme Court decision-making since Mahon in
1922.
Thus, economic viability appears to require three distinct considerations:
1. Profitability of retaining the economic status quo;
287. See id. at 169.
288. There, the Court seems to conflate the easement dedication with a physical
severance, pointing out that the City was requiring her to deed a portion of her property
to it. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994). This is a view that has found
some acceptance, see Michelman, Takings, supra note 195, at 1610, but one that the author
considers ultimately unproductive.
289. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 265,
294-95 (1981) (finding no facial challenge possible in takings cases because only specific
factual situations constitute injury for Fifth Amendment purposes).
290. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980), abrogated by First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1986)
(finding in Agins no showing of injury possible where appellants have not yet submitted
development plan to zoning authority).
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2. Amenability to definitional splintering of the economic
portion of the interest affected; and
3. The private property owner's idea of the economic impact.
If the current use is reasonably profitable then no taking is
found.2 91 However, if the injury can be identified and attached to
an ownership right (provided the owner can show how her29pre2
ferred use is no longer possible) then there may be a taking.
The concept of economic viability, like the market itself, is
neither self-defining nor stable. The historically consistent view of
takings case law would attach the concept to the "degree" analysis
of Mahon.293 Economic viability, under this analysis, could mean
two things: profitability as an objective standard or expectation of
monetary return as a subjective standard. A degree analysis of
profitability would find that a taking has occurred at some point
above the break-even level, since it would be economically unsound to undertake a for-profit project that would merely break
even.2 94 The Supreme Court is unwilling to accept such a mathematical, calculated approach to takings; 295 as noted above, public
benefit and social utility are very difficult to quantify.29 6 However,
it may be the best working definition available for economic viability. 297 The expectation of monetary return is very much like
profitability, except that the property owner is presumed to have
some bottom line in mind at29 which point the project is no longer
worth the time and expense. 1
In the end, the doctrine of economic viability may substantially undermine takings law by tying it to the market, for while
291. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
292. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992);

Williamson County Regional Plan. Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 199 (1985)
293. "[Tlhis is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions:' Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
294. The rhetorical questions of when and what constitutes a profit, are beyond the
ken of this author; there may, perhaps, be guidance from tax and business, but that is not
the purpose of the Article.
295. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
296. See Michelman, Property,Utility and Fairness,supra note 182, at 1173, 1183.
297. See Oswald, supra note 93, at 121-24 (positing purchase price, purchase price
relative to fair market value, and effect on status quo as being unsatisfactory measures of
taking because of difficulty in achieving consistent results).
298. Economic viability, however, does not mean the most beneficial use of the
property. Id. at 124. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962).
Denial of any permits in Penn Central may then have been sufficient to deprive Penn
Central of all "economically viable" use of the property, and find a taking of the property.
Lucas calls this position into some doubt.
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the market embraces change at a rate fast enough to insure its own
survival, the law of regulatory takings may be shattered by attempting to keep that same pace.
B. Views of Property Using Market Logic: Rationalizationof
Property Interests
Theories of regulatory takings should and do derive from the
legally recognized views of property. However, the Court's willingness to infuse market-based conceptions into property law has
proven problematic. The implications of the Court's increased dependence upon quantifiable economic injuries are varied. The courts,
wary of subjective interpretation, are comfortable with quantifiable
events. However, non-economic injuries should not be per se noncompensable. Will individuals who fail to maximize the utility of
their property before a regulation is promulgated be denied compensation? The standard of economic viability may force property
owners to monetarize non-economic values. That constitutional rights
should not be subject to the whims of the majoritarian rule seems
fairly well-accepted. Why then are those same constitutional rights
subject to any societally imposed economic system, indeed defined
and delimited by their economic rationality?
1. Four Approaches to Property Doctrine
In the area of regulatory takings, property is being rationalized, or splintered, into smaller units. Most regulatory takings litigation may be characterized by one of the following four views of
property: the bundle of rights perspective, the legal/doctrinal perspective, the temporal perspective, and the physicalist perspective.
These approaches represent a rationalization, or splintering, of property to increase its alienability and hence its marketization. Although these categories overlap to some extent, they represent a
paradigmatic shift in that they are separately recognized at all. This
provides some evidence that market logic has been adopted in our
views of property.
Analysis of major takings cases in terms of these views of
property will elucidate the concept of economic viability, the core
structure around which takings analysis has formed.
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a. "Bundle of Rights" Perspective
299
Private property is often described as a "bundle of rights.
This view of property breaks property down into its component

strands: the exclusive right,300 the use right,30 1 air rights, 0 2 support

rights,303 quiet enjoyment rights,30 4 waste rights, and so on.305 All
of these claims of right are enforceable at law.

Although the bundle of rights idea of property can contain
many strands, the courts generally focus on the following three:

30 6
use, exclusion, and alienation.
The overall trend in takings law presents the "bundle of rights"

questions in market terms, and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal

Council took another step toward institutionalizing this trend. If an
injury can be defined as a strand, and that "strand" can be removed

from the bundle, then it is easier to conceptualize a taking of that
strand.

307

In Lucas, the Supreme Court found a compensable taking for
the period during which Lucas could not build luxury beach homes
299. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see PROPERTY:
CRITICAL POSITIONS 2 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978) ("In current
common usage, property is things; in law ... property is not things but rights, fights in
or to things"); Margaret J. Radin, The Consequences of Conceptualism, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 239, 242 (1986).
300. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164 (finding loss of right to exclude
non-fee-paying members from marina of sufficient magnitude to require compensation).
301. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1987) (finding no taking when only
possible use-as brewery-found to be illegal under Kansas constitution).
302. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(recognizing air rights as property interest in holding no taking to prevent owner whose
terminal was declared landmark from building multi-story addition over terminal).
303. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (finding loss
of right to mine to surface to be taking of support estate).
304. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (finding
requirement of lateral beach access easement compensable intrusion into right of quiet
enjoyment).
305. The Penn Central case is a good illustration of this metaphor. The "air rights"
were at issue because the New York Landmark Law made it difficult to secure a permit
to build over the Grand Central Terminal. The bundle of rights is the most often litigated.
Keystone Bituminous Coal was, in part, about the support estate. Kaiser Aetna and
PruneYard Shopping were about the exclusive right.
306. See, e.g., JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PRIVATE PROPERTY: TOWARD AN
EGALITARIAN THEORY OF OWNERSHIP 19 (1994). Christman expands on the use right to
include the sub-rights of consumption, modification, destruction, and management. Id. at
29.
307. See Justice Brennan's observations in Penn Central that it is inappropriate to
sever a use from the bundle in determining whether a restriction effects a taking. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1977).
MAINSTREAM AND
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under the newly enacted Beachfront Management Act,30 8 even though
other significant sticks in Lucas' bundle of property rights 0 9 were
310
unaffected by the regulation.
Lucas still possessed the right to exclusive physical access to
his property: 31' to exclude others and to otherwise use it when and
how he saw fit. 312 The kind of privacy and serenity that this property still retained was precisely the quality whose deprivation in
California constituted a taking in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission.31 3 In Nollan, a permit condition compromising this
right was held an unconstitutional taking. Lucas retained the right
to alienate his property. 314 Although the amendment lowered the
resale value of Lucas' land, no precedent supports the proposition
that such devaluation disposes of the owner's right to alienate.3 15
The amendment's use limitation, prohibiting construction of permanent structures, was not a universal proscription on the property's use. 316 He retained the right to use the property for recrea308. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1992).
309, In the Supreme Court, the South Carolina Coastal Council pointed out that the
property retained many uses and Lucas retained a substantial number of rights in the
parcel. After the amendment, see Respondents' Brief at *47, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), availablein WESTLAW, 1992 WL 672613. Lucas
retained the right to exclude others ("[o]ne of the most essential sticks in the bundle"
reiterated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1976)). Both at common law and in the Constitution, the right to exclude is a fundamental
interest in private property.
310. The case involved an amendment to the Coastal Zone Management Act, South
Carolina Beachfront Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(A) (Law Co-op Supp.
1995), that had the effect of making two building lots unbuildable by prohibiting permanent
structures seaward of the newly designated line. Id. at § 48-39-290(A). Real estate
developer David Lucas' lots were in the new no-build zone. See Respondents' Brief at *8,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), available in WESTLAW,
1992 WL 672613. The trial court found that the enactment of the legislation had rendered
the property "valueless." Id. at *46-*47.
311. See Respondents' Brief at *47, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992), available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 672613.
312. See id. (implying that many uses were still available, including recreational, at
any time he wanted to so use property).
313. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
314. See Respondents' Brief at *47, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992), available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 672613.
315. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Clearly, however, recovery of investment
and the right of alienation are distinct legal concepts. For example, the adjacent landowners might have found it an attractive possibility to expand their holdings by purchasing
these parcels, thereby insuring that, even with the vagaries of the legislative will, these
parcels would remain unbuilt. He was under no proscription. Thus, not only did he have
the right to alienate the property, he may even have had lucrative possibilities.
316. See Respondents' Brief at *48 n.41, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992), available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 672613.
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tional purposes-like the church camp in FirstEnglish.3 17 He might
erect non-permanent structures, like a trailer or tent. An abridgement of a use right, even if severe, previously had8not on its own
31
been sufficient to defeat "all economic viability."
Thus, Lucas retained the right of exclusion, the right of access,
the right to alienate, and a reduced right of use. What rights did
he lose? The amendment prohibited Lucas' most preferred use of
the property 31 9 and the most economically intensive use of the
property. 320 The court's disposition of the case shed little light on
which weighed more heavily on its decision because Lucas' preferred use was also the most economically intensive one.
Given the outcome in Lucas321 and its subsequent disposition
on remand to the South Carolina Supreme Court, 322 it is fair to infer
the following: taken together, the right to exclude, the right of

unrestricted access, the right to make passive and recreational use
of the parcels, and the right to sell the property, constitute "no

economic-viability" because the court labeled the property "valueless." Thus, economic viability must have an extra-property meaning; this is evidence of the constitutional splintering of property
317. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 304 (proscribing only
construction of buildings and permanent structure, but not day use), on remand, First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 902
(Ct. App. 1989) (specifically recognizing recreational uses as having sufficient value to
defeat argument that church had been deprived of all economically viable use).
318. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (gravel excavation);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brickyard); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887) (brewery).
319. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-10; Respondents' Brief at *47 n.40, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), availablein WESTLAW, 1992 WL
672613 (noting takings rule cannot "turn on the subjective vagaries and objectives of the
particular owner... *"). Accord Oswald, supra note 93 at 121.
320. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-10; Respondents' Brief at *46 n.38, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), availablein WESTLAW, 1992 WL
672613.
321. The statute was found suspect for the remarkable reason that the trial court,
correctly or otherwise, determined that the Act had rendered the owner's land "valueless"
and, regardless of the State's interest in the regulation, required compensation. The
Supreme Court for the first time since articulating the standard assumed that the trial
court's determination met the standard of "no economic viability," and, since it is now
possible to receive damages for a temporary taking, First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987), 'Lucas could sue for damages
if the use was not a nuisance under South Carolina law. If not, the use inhered in the
original title.
322. The South Carolina Supreme Court found no cognizable right in State property
law to restrict the development of property for the reasons articulated in the statute. See
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (1992) (on remand).
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interests. When a landowner is denied the most intensive economic
use of his property or his most preferred use (i.e., luxury residential development), the Constitution may require payment, regard323
less of the state's interest in regulating use.
Furthermore, Lucas was, ultimately, the arbiter of the meaning
of "economic viability."324 The market defined the property interest
Lucas sought to protect since the market was the source of his
profit and loss. The Supreme Court acknowledged his market definition of the right. 32 5 Therefore, the Supreme Court recognized the
market logic of randomly splintering property rights in the framework of takings jurisprudence.
b. Physicalist View of Property
Lucas concededly lost his most profitable interest in his property. To the extent that the right to build a luxury house on the
beach sufficiently deprived him of a "strand" in his bundle to
constitute a compensable taking may say much about the malleability of these abstract strands: sometimes they are present but
thin; 326 sometimes they are irrelevant to economic development, but
so "thick" that their loss is a taking; 327 or sometimes just comparatively thick enough to afford compensation to an aggrieved owner.328
323. It has been said that the holding in Lucas is one that will never be seen or used
again. See Lazarus, supra note 9, at 1427 (noting that in area of environmental litigation
"the categorical presumption will rarely apply"). Professor Lazarus describes the Lucas
case itself as "a hypothetical fact pattern." Id. at 1421. It is, however, a clear sign of the
Court's unwillingness to countenance certain restrictions on the use of private property,
one that land use planners, owners, and other interested parties would be foolish to ignore.
324. The Supreme Court's willingness to address the takings question on the merits
is due, at least in part, to Lucas' recalcitrance in allowing the governmental purpose issue
to be litigated at all. See Respondents' Brief at *37, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), available in WESTLAW, 1992 WL 672613 (contending
"the petitioner never made a serious effort to rebut the fact that this area was an unsafe
area to build upon.') As Justice Blackmun pointed out in dissent, the Council's failure to
be heard on this question surely did not preclude the Supreme Court from hearing it.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1045 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
325. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 & n.7 (describing his pleaded injury clearly
erroneously as "a fee simple interest"); id. at 1018 (stating that regulations requiring land
to be left "substantially in its natural state" leaves owner "without beneficial or productive
options for its use?').
326. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (finding
deprivation of right to exclude protesters insufficiently strong to violate California constitutional protection of right of expression on shopping center property).
327. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2322 (1994) (finding
easement dedication illegitimate use of police power not remediable by just compensation).
328. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (finding
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The physicalist view is much more straightforward. The physicalist view of property regards each three-dimensional inch as a
separately protectable right. 29 This perspective comprises the dispute between the majority and the dissenting opinions in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis3 0 In this case, the
Association claimed that the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act 331 was
an unconditional taking of private property.3 3 2 The Association was
specifically concerned33with the loss of the coal pillars and the loss
of the support estate.
The majority opinion characterized the regulation as one that
prohibited the mining of 2% of the total coal available.33 4 The
of
dissenting Justices viewed the regulation as one that "took" all 33
5
the coal under protected areas, which amounted to 27 million tons.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone is also in direct contradiction to the majority in Penn Central, which refused to view
the air rights as a separate physical piece of the property.3 36 This
can be contrasted with Nollan, in which the Court took a decidedly
broader view of a physical parcel than had theretofore been the
that in this case right to exclude-to be "exclusive"-was so important to petitioner's
expectations that it had to be compensated if compromised).
329. The physicalist view was very much in evidence in the dissent to the Keystone
case. Justice Rehnquist in dissent pointed out that all of the coal that had to be left in
pillars to prevent subsidence, had "no economically viable use:' Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 514 (1987). The majority found that the
separation of those physical parcels and the support estate would be doctrinally insupportable. Id. at 500. The Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the most recent takings case, found
just the opposite, holding that the physical portion that was to be left undeveloped for
flood control could be severed from the whole and evaluated for the takings claim. See
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994).
330. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
331. PA. STAT. ANN tit. 52 § 1406.1-.21 (1995) (requiring pillars of coal to be left
in place to prevent subsurface subsidence).
332. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 478-79.
333. The latter of which had been described in Mahon as "a very valuable estate"
in land. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
334. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 498 ("The 27 million tons of coal do not constitute a
separate segment of property for takings law purposes.").
335.
In this case, enforcement of the Subsidence Act and its regulations will require
petitioners to leave approximately 27 million tons of coal in place. There is
no question that this coal is an identifiable and separable property interest
.... The regulation... does not merely inhibit one strand in the bundle ....
but instead destroys completely any interest in a segment of property.
See id. at 517-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
336. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
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case.3 37 There, the Court determined that a demand for a deeded
easement was tantamount to a requirement that a physical portion
of the property be yielded to the public. 338 It furthermore evaluated
the extent of the loss against the "parcel" demanded-which came
339
to one hundred percent-rather than against the entire parcel.

The attraction of the physical view of property should be clear:
an interest recognized as a physical parcel will receive greater scrutiny. Thus, the category creates the incentive to redefine interests
as physical parcels for compensation purposes.
In the area of regulatory takings, the Supreme Court has increasingly recognized this splintering and analyzed the newly defined
and separated right as "property." Conceptually severing a portion
of property affected by a regulation (for example, a six- foot strip)
makes it easier for the Court to demand compensation. Such a
regulation might eliminate all economic viability in that portion of
the property.

40

c. Temporal View of Property

The temporal view of property involves rights that accrue because of the passage of time. 341 If property can be divided temporally, then an interruption in ownership is more easily viewed as a
3 42
total deprivation.

337. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
338. See id. at 832.
339. Though no precise figure is given in the case, the affected parcel was clearly
much smaller than the whole.
340. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994).
341. Thus, for example, the interruption of a property right is itself the confiscation
of a property right and therefore compensable. See First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). See also Richard Epstein, Past
and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property (Symposium: Time, Property
Rights, and the Common Law), 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667 (1986) (arguing temporal interest
is obviously cognizable); John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominatorin Regulatory Takings
Claims, 61 U. CH. L. REV. 1535, 1542-43 (1994) (asserting temporal aspect is easily
identifiable denominator); Margaret J. Radin, Time, Possession and Alienation, 64 WASH.
U. L.Q. 739 (1986) (arguing temporal aspect of property ownership should be compensable
only if time has resulted in development of owner's personhood in property).
342. See, e.g., First English, 482 U.S. 304 (finding temporary deprivation can be
severe enough to warrant compensation, not just nullification of offending regulation); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656-57 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (advocating adoption of temporal severance as tool for deciding takings cases).
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Temporal severance is clear in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,343 and its predecessor San
Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego. 44 In both cases, land
use rights were commodified as temporal units: This type of quantification lends itself to market logic analysis because it is one way
to judge the loss of economic viability.
To answer the economic viability question, one must first answer the question "Which part?" Certainly, any property subject to
regulation can be divided into those units that will support the
finding of a taking. If one asks, "What part?" it is not hard to
answer, "The part injured by the regulation." Thus, market logic
finds its own resolution by classifying property into its most exchangeable units.
d. Legal/doctrinalView of Property
Legal severance involves redefining traditional legal bases for
justifying the police power. The legal/doctrinal view of property
sees property as it is defined by statutory and common-law doctrine.3 45 Particularly, Nollan, Lucas, and Tigard narrow the traditional rationale of the police power by trivializing it and denigrating its constitutional force. These cases disintegrate the conventional
conception of abating a nuisance by both blurring the line between
avoiding harms and promoting benefits, and specifically limiting
3 46
such police power to the narrowest, most traditional nuisance law.
Under this scheme, it is obvious that the South Carolina Coastal
Commission would have had a hard time showing that beach erosion is a common-law nuisance. Indeed, the South Carolina Supreme Court did not recognize it as such, finding that a temporary
regulatory taking had occurred. 347 Furthermore, since under Lucas
343. 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (recognizing claim for temporary taking).

344. See 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (encouraging Court to
recognize the lengthy delay attendant to certain regulations as compensable takings during
the period of delay).

345. The law of trespass, for example, as well as of prescriptive easements, provides
some long established legal property doctrines, the violation of which would be an

abridgment of a property right. This is the "property" favored by the Supreme Court in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
346. See id. at 1029.
347. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991), rev'd, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992).
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it is unnecessary to defeat the assertion of valid police power if
the land is rendered valueless, the owner who can convince the trial
court of this fact will have a taking for which compensation must
be made.
It is certainly consistent with recent takings decisions to blur
the line between harms and benefits-since they are irrelevant to
the question of whether there has been a taking-but the Court has
acted unnecessarily and imprudently in jettisoning this part of its
takings framework. It has done so under the pressure of the market,
which sees neither harms nor benefits as the state would properly
define them (and the Court therefore does not see them either).
Rather, the Court recognizes only the splintered interest of the two
lost opportunities for luxury housing. As so defined, the total loss
of this property interest can only result in a taking for which
compensation must be made.
The heart of the issue of what constitutes a taking lies increasingly in the definition of private property. Private property rights
derive from the state, thus the fundamental definition comes from
state law as delimited by the Constitution. The source of that
definition lies in the conception of the nature and function of the
3 48
American state.
The Court struggles in these cases with the question of whether
to sever the "damaged" part of the property from the whole parcel
(Keystone); 49 or whether to evaluate differently the claim that an
350
essential stick in the bundle has been removed (Kaiser Aetna);
whether there is a principled difference between preventing nox352
ious uses (Hadacheck)51 and promoting beneficial ones (Lucas)
(Penn Central);35 3 or preventing certain uses (San Diego Gas) 35 4 or
348. A comprehensive discussion of these issues is far beyond the scope of this
Article.
349. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-99
(1987).
350. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979) (stating right

to exclude others is so fundamental to property that its removal constitutes taking).
351. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (holding ordinance banning
brick manufacturing facility within residential district was valid exercise of police power).
352. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023 (1992)
(stating principle that regulation that substantially advances state interests does not
constitute taking).

353. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 108
(1978) (noting that New York City believed its landmarks preservation law would foster
civic pride and promote tourism).
354. See, e.g., San Diego Gas and Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
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3 55 whether an essential
positively requiring them (Penn Central);
stick has been removed (Hodel v. Irving), 56 or one that is less so
(PruneYard);57 or even whether a regulation is efficient35 because
it properly involves the owner, spreads risk, and promotes the right

level of investment (Tigard) 59 or not (Lucas),360 a fundamental

failure of the courts is their failure to see market logic at work in
this framework. Clearly the courts do see the economics of these
cases. They do miss first, what the substance of the law should
contain; and second, a fundamental and insidious assumption about
how the market controls regulation and the benefit it derives from
so doing.
C. The Problem of Allowing Markets to Define Constitutional
Protections
Although the existence of administrative regulation is by no
means universally celebrated, the complexity and size of the twentieth-century market economy requires some greater means of control than was appropriate in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
agrarian America. Takings analysis has become an exercise in redistribution since the convergence of the cost-benefit analysis of
Mahon and the marketization of the United States. But courts do
not ask whether it is necessary or proper to transform social questions into economic issues as they struggle to decide takings disputes. This is because the logic of markets, as applied to social
621 (1981) (rejecting plaintiff's claim as unripe, but declining to rule that city rezoning

plan would not constitute taking if plaintiff denied entire beneficial use of property).
355. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 108.
356. See, e.g., 481 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987) (ruling complete abolition of both

descent and devise might be taking even when intended to ameliorate the extreme
fractioning of Indian lands, noting fundamental nature of abrogated rights).

357. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that
right to exclude is not absolute and may be outweighed by free speech rights).
358. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88

CoLuM. L. REv. 1697, 1704 (1988).
359. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (holding City's action

taking where building permit was made conditional upon dedication of land to bicycle
path, because City failed to demonstrate that its demands were related in nature and extent

to development in question).
360. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)
("[wVhen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically

beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle, he has suffered-a taking").
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institutions like private property, prevents the courts from seeing
the damaging consequences of their application of the logic.
Market logic prevents us from seeing that: (1) it is undermining state legitimacy; (2) it is causing a continuing increase in unpredictability in planning decisions; (3) splintering an interest in
order to protect it may not be good for private property in the long
run; and (4) some property interests really should be protected
even though they do not fit within a market framework.
The Supreme Court risks serious jurisprudential problems in
endorsing this splintering of property interests, declaring the separate splinters "property" and requiring compensation under the
Fifth Amendment. Among these jurisprudential problems, the risks
of unpredictability and judicial illegitimacy have received the most
attention. Two others, no less serious but far more insidious, are
the problems of undermining the police power and the eventual
collapse of the principled distinction between protectable property
and non-protectable property.
1. Legitimacy
When the state (one of whose arms is the court) uses its
powers inappropriately, it risks losing its legitimacy, arguably the
last institutional layer between order and chaos. Certainly, the Supreme Court has been under attack since Penn Central for unabashed agenda-seeking.3 61 However, just as the Court cannot allow
itself to be driven by popularity, neither can it appear to promote
a political agenda, or serve as a trier of fact, lest it forfeit its
legitimacy. For example, the Court risked its legitimacy in the
1970s when it became a trial court for obscenity offenses, when
its doctrine for First Amendment violations was: "I know it when

I see

it.

'

362

361. See William A. Falik & Anna C. Shimko, The "Takings" Nexus-The Supreme
Court Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View From California, 39

HASTINGS L.J. 359, 371-76, 389-96 (1988); Lazarus, supra note 9, at 1414; William W.
Justice, The New Awakening: Judicial Activism in a Conservative Age, 43 S.W.L.J. 657,
658, 672 (1989); Mark V. Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326,
1330-31 (1990) (reviewing SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION

(1989)).
362. Justice Potter Stewart is "credited" with coining this phrase in the context of
obscenity and First Amendment violations. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring). The Court in the 1970s had to view the allegedly obscene
material-including watching movies-before it could render its decisions. Beyond the
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2. Unpredictability
The Supreme Court's inability to reach consensus on a doctrinal framework for takings analysis leads to unpredictability in
the lower courts, in planning bodies, and among owners and developers. Lower courts have struggled with the takings issue, trying
to harmonize apparently inconsistent results and incompatible doctrines. They have tried to interpret economic viability with almost
no guidance from the Supreme Court and, absent a clear indication
of the limits of this standard, they have given it inconsistent effect
indeed.36 3 Some have denied compensation for a 95% reduction in
property value, 364 while others have awarded compensation for far
less.3 65 This unpredictability is due in part to the Court's poor
arguably laughable picture of their reviewing evidence of this type, the Court had such a'
difficult time articulating the legal standards for First Amendment protection of pornographic material that it effectively sat as a trier of fact in every case for which it granted
certiorari. The power that is retained by the Court when the law is this unclear makes for
a perception that decisions may be unpredictable (and therefore arbitrary) and for a
perception of instability-that decisions can never be final until they have been adjudicated
in the Supreme Court. The Court faces a similar problem today as it struggles with the
takings issue, an issue that is proving as recalcitrant of predictable application and final
adjudication as the obscenity cases of the 1970s.
363. See, e.g., Haas v. San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980) (holding conceded 95% reduction in value-2,000,000 to
$100,000-not taking because owner was nevertheless allowed to develop property, which
retained some value). But see Hernandez v. Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1198 n.17, 1200
(5th Cir. 1981) (finding single-family residential classification to render property economically non-viable because property was bounded by floodplain and sewage treatment plant,
and was subject to easements).
364. See, e.g., Kawaoka v. Arroyo Grande, 796 F. Supp. 1320 (C.D. Cal. 1992)
(rejecting takings claim despite loss of $6,000,000 in anticipated land sale profits); 900
G. Street Assocs. v. Dep't of Housing & Community Dev., 430 A.2d 1387, 1391-92 (D.C.
1981) (holding there had been no taking when City prevented plaintiff from demolishing
building registered as historic landmark after plaintiff's purchase; finding existence of
reasonable alternative economic use for building dispositive, regardless of plaintiff's
expectation of higher profit, or of purchase price of building); Haas v. San Francisco, 605
F.2d 1117 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating developer's disappointed expectations cannot be turned
into taking); accord Kalorama Heights Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia Dep't of
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 655 A.2d 865, 871 (D.C. 1995).
365. For example, the property owner in Dolan lost at most only 15% of her
property to the ordinance requiring the floodplain greenway and recreation easement.
There was never even an assertion that she would lose all economically viable use of the
entire property, yet a taking was found. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct.
2309, 2314, 2316 n.12 (1994). Similarly in Lucas, Justice Stevens makes the same charge,
citing the hypothetical situation of a home destroyed on the same beach to illustrate
inconsistent outcomes of the rule. Lucas would be able to recover (for a lost opportunity),
while his neighbor (who has lost both the opportunity to rebuild and her home) would
not. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1064-65 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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choice of cases, 366 but more significantly to the Court's use of
market logic to identify the range of property interests deserving
Constitutional protection. If the courts, as an arm of the state, have
abdicated authority to define the object of its protection, then the
object of its protection will be as changeable as the litigants that
come before the courts.
3. Loss of Police Power Protection
Since Mahon there has been a presumption by the Court that
the police power serves the public good to the detriment of private
property. This is the assumption behind the oft-quoted phrase that
"if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking 3 67
Even Mahon's "implied limitation" 36 bespeaks a reluctance to yield
private rights. The Court fails to appreciate the role of the police
power in protecting private rights, including the right to private
property.
The case of Hodel v. Irving369 demonstrates this phenomenon.
Under the General Allotment Act of 1887, individual Indians and
tribes were granted tracts of land ("allotments"). As Justice O'Connor pointed out, those property holders held their land subject to
the trust of the federal government, which held the underlying fee.
Because the Indians could not alienate the property without special
permission from the government, much of it stayed in the same
family, fractioning by devise or intestacy for a century before the
Consolidation Act was passed. 370

366. As Justice Souter points out in Dolan, "The right case for the enunciation of
takings doctrine seems hard to spot." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2331 (1994)
(Souter, J., dissenting). There was a period in the 1980s when most cases were dismissed
as unripe. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Plan. Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985) (dismissing takings claim where respondent had failed to obtain final
decision regarding application of contested regulations to affected property); San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (dismissing takings claim as
unripe where lower courts had refused appellant monetary damages, but had yet to decide
whether other remedies were available).

367. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
368. Id. at 413; see supra text accompanying note 125.
369. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
370. The rights were originally splintered due to an inability by the native populations to resist the market forces that induced them to dispose of their properties under the
federal trust doctrine. Id. at 707. The policy of allotment of Indian land transformed the
Indians into petty landlords. Rather than fanning the land, the Indians leased their allotted
shares to white ranchers and farmers and lived off the meager rentals.
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The Supreme Court found the statute abrogating those limited
alienation rights to be unconstitutional by a unanimous vote. The
extreme splintering of interests caused by the unusual operation of
the federal trust doctrine 371 and the limited right of alienation of
those trust lands3 72 to white settlers was not the relevant issue to
the Court. 373 Rather the Court viewed its decision as protecting a
principle: the oft-heralded basic right to pass property to one's
heirs. 374 The Court inadvertently protected not a property principle,
but rather the status of the native populations as victims of the
market. Thus, the property that was being protected found its primary definition in the splintering logic of the market. The Court's
inability to see that it was simply accepting as a protectable property interest something whose ultimate provenance was the market,
not law, is testament to the pervasiveness and invisibility of this
force. Ultimately, a market economy, the development and maintenance of which is a source of never-ending difficulty on the reservations, was undermined by a randomly splintered view of a protectable property interest.
Thus, this method of defining compensable property interests
may work to the detriment of private property in the long run. The
end result might be to undermine the state's police power, imperiling the security of private property itself.375 By redefining every
interest affected by regulation as a separately cognizable property
right, the Court has taken the first step along this path. The next
step is to find that regulations can effect takings as soon as they
are promulgated. 376 At the extreme, every regulation might require
371. Id. at 715. The federal trust doctrine views the relationship between the Indian
tribes and the Federal government as one of protection. While the oldest cases view the
relationship as one of guardian to ward or teacher to student, more recent invocations of

the doctrine, like Irving, resemble more of a fiduciary responsibility.
372. Id. at 707.

373.
374.
375.
376.

Id. at 718.
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
See discussion supra part III.A.
This is part of Justice Stevens' critique in his dissent in First English:

[T]he fact that a regulation would constitute a taking if allowed to remain in
effect permanently is by no means dispositive of the question whether the

effect that the regulation has already had on the property is so severe that a
taking occurred during the period before the regulation was invalidated.

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
328-29 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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compensation. As Justice Holmes exhorted in Mahon: "[G]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law."3 77 By eviscerating the police power,
private property might successfully be secured against government
intrusion; but without the police power, nothing could secure such
interests against private intrusion. Thus, for the Fifth Amendment
to have efficacy, the police power must have legitimacy.
4. Non-Cognizable Property Interests
Finally, market logic cannot be the first resort for definitions
of constitutionally protectable property interests. This Article has
developed this assertion extensively, but the primary reason is that
for the market to flourish it must not be permitted to invade spheres
of life unsuited to its logic. Property relations is one of those
spheres. Some property rights may not be cognizable under this
model because they were never economically viable or the source
of investment-backed expectation, or of a value that the courts have
ruled could be diminished. Further, other rights may have to be
redefined inappropriately in order to be protected.
This problem resonates in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association,378 where the Court refused First Amendment protection to a worship ground on federal land threatened
with destruction by the construction of a road. It would not have
qualified for Fifth Amendment protection either, unless the tribe
could have established the parcel's "economic viability." Such a
redefinition of the property right would have been highly inappropriate, offending many of the traditional values attaching to property: a culture's sense and expectation of rootedness, the sacredness of place, and the responsibility of private property owners to
the local and national community. 379 It should not be necessary to
frame these values in economic terms in order to protect them.

377. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
378. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
379. See id. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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VII. A MODIFIED FRAMEWORK

Seemingly without reflection, the Court has adopted a market

framework that promotes the splintering of property interests. The
Court should now stop to examine the effects of its approach, for
it threatens to undermine the very interests the Court purports to
protect.
The following proposal is offered to allow for appropriate use
of economic criteria to help assess the compensability of state
regulation of private property.
A. The Court Must Reassume Its Duty to Decide Whether a
Dispute Involves Property
38 0
The primary definition of property derives from state law. If
the courts are to use such fragmented paradigms as temporal property interests, physical property interests, bundles of rights, and
traditional legal property interests, they must fit expressly within
the property framework recognized by State law. The Court must
adopt a coherent analytical framework through which to identify
protectable property interests. 31l With such a framework in place,
private interests would find it more difficult to manipulate the laws
of property to their own advantage. This Article has proposed but
one set of categories. It matters less which framework the Court
adopts than that the chosen standards are clearly articulated and
consistently applied.
For example, the Court in Monsanto posited several characteristics of "property": it is assignable; it can form the res of a
trust; it passes to a trustee in bankruptcy; and it is the product of
one's "labour and invention. 382 Similarly, in Dolan, the majority
opinion refers to state law principles in analyzing whether Ms.

380. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see
also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
381. There is some inkling of this when Justice Stevens suggested in Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994), that the regulation in question was better analyzed as
a business regulation, not a regulation of property use. See id. at 2325 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Some members of the Court are clearly uneasy with the sweeping reclassifica-

tion of so many injuries as the deprivation of a property right and are trying to propose
principled doctrinal distinctions. See, e.g, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
183-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
382. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1002-03 (1984).
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Dolan's injury was to a protected property interest. 83 Although that
case concerned itself with the nexus question, the Court easily
could have begun its inquiry by analyzing whether the state's definition of a property interest encompassed the injury in question. Just
as the Court has refused to accept blindly the proposition that a
regulation serves the public interest, 38 4 so, too, should it be skeptical of the owner's assertion that the injury is to a "property" right
worthy of constitutional protection. The Court has rigorously examined claims involving injuries to an "interest" that was not
conventionally "property" because it was not land.385 There is no
logical reason for the Court to treat differently "interests" that
appear to be tied to land or land use.
The temptation with this step of the test is for the Court to
slip into what it is doing now: severing the restriction and calling
it a property right. This should be balanced somewhat by first
determining what property is. But the Court must be careful to
make its determination based on principles of property law, and
not market logic, lest the entire framework collapse, leaving private
property owners, regulators, legislators, and courts no better off
than before.

B. Five-Element Test of the Effect of the Regulation on the
Property
If the property interest in question is found to be protectable,
the court must still determine whether the disputed action constitutes a taking. First, the courts should determine whether the state
action serves a legitimate purpose. If so, the court should then
perform a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis to determine whether
the action is economically justified. Finally, the court should identify
383. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-19.

384. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987) (finding
demand for lateral beach access easement to be unrelated to public interest of preserving
view of beach from road).
385. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe and Products of California, Inc. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (dealing with employer's withdrawal liability
to multi-employer pension plan under Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of
1980); Connolly v. Pension Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (challenging constitutionality of withdrawal liability provisions of Multi-employer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1980).
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and evaluate the non-economic impacts of the regulation, before
making its decision.
1. The Public Good Achieved by the Regulation
The state must articulate a legitimate purpose for its action.
This step is similar to the traditional element articulated in so many
takings cases: What is the nature of the governmental regulation?
How compelling is it? It does not matter whether that purpose is
an attempt to abate a public nuisance, or to effect a public good.
It only matters whether the state gives voice to a purpose that is
within its purview to seek. This element generally will not be
difficult to satisfy.
2. The "Cost" to the Regulated Owner
This step is similar to the tests of diminution in value,386 investment-backed expectation, 387 and economic viability.388 The difference
is that under the aforementioned steps A and B the property interest
at issue has already been established, thereby providing the "denominator" in the cost equation. The value of those two previous
steps here becomes apparent: if the interest is already recognized
as a category of property interest, then it is much easier to calculate
the true effect of the regulation.
Suppose, for example, a property interest including the traditional estates (mineral, surface, support, and air), and a proposed
regulation partially constraining the mineral right. Having identified the interest at stake (the mineral right) the courts will be in
a much better position to analyze the cost of the regulation. The
courts would not be tempted to reclassify the interest as a physical
right, the regulation of which causes the loss of 2% or 5% of the
physical parcel. The analytical framework will be clear, consistent
both internally and with state law, and legitimate.
386. See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922)

(stating right to coal consists in right to mine it, and hence rule that makes it commercially
impracticable to mine coal has same effect for Constitutional purposes as appropriating or
destroying it).
387. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

388. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992);
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36.
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3. Economic Protection Afforded by Police Power
In calculating the benefits of the regulation the courts must
employ a broad notion of economic "standing," accounting for the
ultimate consequences of the action, and not just its direct effects.
In having committed themselves to cost-benefit analysis, the courts
should be required to do it right. Thus, the courts should consider
the benefits not only to the private property owner, but also to the
economy at large.
For example, the imposition of navigational servitude on Kuapa
Pond389 may have reduced the property values of those parcels
abutting the pond and eliminated the owner's ability to collect the
homeowner's fee due to increased public use of the marina and
channel. However, the restriction would have had positive economic effects as well. The increase in use due to public access
would benefit the local economy. Likewise, David Lucas 390 could
write off the regulatory loss, an unexamined benefit. Home prices
probably experienced some upward pressure when the potential
supply decreased by two, benefitting both individual homeowners
seeking home equity loans or selling their homes, and the local tax
base (or at least partially offsetting the loss of income from these
two properties). The Nollans 391 were being permitted to build a
much larger and more luxurious home on the beach where they had
not theretofore lived. In addition to this direct benefit was the
benefit to all homeowners of an improved housing stock. Monsanto3 92 received financial benefits from having its pesticides registered with the federal government. Finally, First English Church 393
was being saved the risk of a lawsuit, which would have provided
some benefit in the form of reduced insurance rates.
Thus, regulatory costs often have hidden benefits, and the
courts should be made to account for them if they are going to use
this line of analysis to determine whether a regulation has taken
private property. Once the courts are finished with this comprehen-

389. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180.
390. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.

391. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
392. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
393. See First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
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sive assessment, they should analyze the next element: the economic costs imposed by the regulation.
4. Economic Costs Imposed by Exercise of Police Power
In addition to the direct costs of regulation are indirect costs,
another economic standing question. After the court has assessed
the direct costs outlined in Section 2 of this Part, and has assessed
the indirect economic benefits afforded as outlined in Section 3 of
this Part, it should examine the indirect costs. These are the detriments to the larger economy. For example, factors such as depressed investment resulting from regulations and "demoralization
costs '394 should be part of this calculus. The local economy near
the Nollans 395 may have suffered as a result of tourists' or locals'
inability to see the ocean from the road with the new house in
place. First English Church 396 may have lost congregation members
as a result of being unable to run its camp, interfering with its
ability to minister to the community. The Lucas family 3 9 7 -if indeed they were to have lived in one of the homes-would not be
able to live in the community, depriving the local economy of their
contribution. Once these indirect costs and benefits are assessed,
the courts can make the final calculation: non-economic benefits
and harms.
5. Analysis of Non-Economic Benefits and Injuries
Finally, the courts must articulate and separate the economic
from the non-economic injuries: the importance of eagle feathers
in Native American religious rituals, 398 the importance of the right
400
to exclude, 399 the security provided by improved flood control,
394. See Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness, supra note 182, at 1214.

395. See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
396. See FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. 304.

397. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
398. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (holding that denial of traditional
property right-right of Indians to use eagle feathers for religious rituals-does not always
amount to taking).
399. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
400. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316 (finding no taking where permit conditioned

upon redevelopment, contrasting this condition with requirement that owner give public
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the connection to the past afforded by historical preservation, 40t the
loss of autonomy caused by regulation, 40 2 and the loss of liberty. 40 3
These intangibles are often overlooked, producing inconsistent results. If they, like direct and indirect economic costs and benefits,
are expressly considered within the takings analysis, the framework
will reflect more accurately the complexity and precision the problem demands.
D. Calculating the Outcome
Once the courts have expressly analyzed all of the criteria
demanded by the problem, they are in a position to announce
reliable, consistent, non-reversible decisions. The Supreme Court
has expressed its preference for economic data. This proposed
modified framework merely incorporates the unarticulated assumption that market logic should inform the analysis of constitutionally
protected property interests by separating the work of law from the
work of markets. This framework simply returns control over that
debate to the appropriate forum: the legislature and the courts.
Application of the proposed framework would facilitate consistent
outcomes, providing a rational guide to public and private actors
negotiating the extraordinarily difficult process of improving the
lot of both individuals and the polity.
VIII. CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that the doctrine of regulatory takings
has been beset by a decisional framework that is ill-suited to stable
access to his land, noting that owner here retained right to exclude others, and hence was
not deprived of "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights commonly
characterized as property").
401. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107-10, 132-35
(1978) (holding that actions pursuant to New York City's comprehensive plan to preserve
structures of historic and aesthetic interest were not takings).
402. See generally Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987)
(stating that commission could legally require Nollans to provide spot on their property
for passersby to view ocean).
403. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136 (holding that city law is not rendered invalid
by its failure to provide "just compensation" whenever a land owner is restricted in
exploitation of property interests, such as air rights, to greater extent than provided for by
applicable zoning laws).
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constitutional jurisprudence: the random splintering of market logic.
While the historical ties to industrialization and the development
of a market economy and administrative state are clear, they are
not inevitable. Market logic applied to takings disputes has caused
a proliferation of doctrines and elements. It has, most importantly,
shifted the authority to define property from the state to the individual. This shift has destabilized property and takings law. The
Supreme Court must recognize that it has gone beyond classical
liberalism in embracing market logic as its framework for deciding
these cases. It must now choose a framework that is compatible
with stable constitutional jurisprudence. This Article has proposed
one such doctrinal approach.
Whether Justices Holmes and Brandeis were describing the
conditions of the early twentieth century, predicting the future, or
attempting to direct the development of social, economic, and legal
relations, it is clear that over seventy years of litigation and commentary have further confused the debate started in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon. There must be some agreement over the role
of the administrative state in society, and some sense of the difference between legal, social, economic, and political questions. If the
market wins, the market may lose.
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